| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: release the internal TCP sock on IPPROTO_SMC socket creation failure
IPPROTO_SMC sockets create an internal TCP sock ("clcsock") from the
proto->init hook. When socket creation fails after proto->init has
run - e.g. a cgroup BPF program attached to BPF_CGROUP_INET_SOCK_CREATE
denies the socket - sk_common_release() only invokes sk_prot->destroy
if it is set, but neither smc_inet_prot nor smc_inet6_prot defines it,
and smc_destruct() returns early unless sk_state is SMC_CLOSED. As a
result, every failing socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_SMC) call
leaks one tcp_sock, so an unprivileged task able to attach a deny-all
BPF_CGROUP_INET_SOCK_CREATE program to its own cgroup can grow kernel
memory unboundedly.
Add a .destroy hook to both protos that releases the clcsock via
smc_clcsock_release(). smc_sk_init() hashes the sock into the smc
hashinfo before the clcsock is created, and smc_diag dumps walk that
hash dereferencing smc->clcsock without taking clcsock_release_lock,
while sk_common_release() calls .destroy before .unhash. Unhash the
sock before releasing the clcsock, as __smc_release() does, so a
concurrent dump cannot observe the release; the second unhash in
sk_common_release() is a no-op. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix race l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() vs. put_chan
For L2CAP sockets without owning sk->sk_socket, reading
l2cap_pi(sk)->chan may race against concurrent l2cap_sock_kill() ->
l2cap_sock_put_chan(). This excludes simultaneous proto_ops callbacks,
but access in l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() has unsafe lockless read.
[Task 1] [Task 2 (hdev->workqueue)]
l2cap_sock_release(parent) l2cap_disconn_cfm
l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen l2cap_conn_del
bt_accept_dequeue l2cap_chan_del
lock_sock(sk) l2cap_sock_teardown_cb
bt_accept_unlink
bt_sk(sk)->parent = NULL
release_sock(sk) ----------------> lock_sock(sk)
parent = /* NULL */
lock_sock(sk) <--------------------- release_sock(sk)
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED)
l2cap_sock_close_cb
l2cap_sock_kill(sk)
l2cap_sock_put_chan
chan = READ l2cap_pi(sk)->chan l2cap_pi(sk)->chan = NULL
l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero l2cap_put_chan(chan)
kref_get_unless_zero(&chan->ref)
Task 1 may observe NULL which causes null-ptr-deref.
Fix the race by taking lock_sock() in l2cap_sock_kill() to
synchronize with l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen(). hold_unless_zero() is not
needed here, l2cap_pi(sk)->chan owns reference if it is non-NULL.
Clarify code comments vs. locking. |
| SysReptor is a fully customizable pentest reporting platform. Prior to 2026.58, installations that enable password reset by email while configuring ALLOWED_HOSTS with a wildcard accept an attacker-controlled Host header when generating a password reset link. An unauthenticated attacker can request a reset email whose link points to an attacker-controlled system, and a victim who follows that link can disclose the reset token, allowing the attacker to reset the victim's password and take over the account. Exploitation also requires a configured email gateway and an email address for the victim, while some reverse proxy configurations may reject the hostile Host header. This issue is fixed in version 2026.58. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: validate banner payload length
When parsing the Ceph messenger v2 protocol banner, the `payload_len` field
is decoded from the banner prefix. If a client sends a banner with a
`payload_len` of 0, the kernel sets up a 0-length socket read. This
violates an invariant in the state machine, triggering a warning in
`populate_in_iter()`:
------------[ cut here ]------------
!iov_iter_count(&con->v2.in_iter)
WARNING: net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 at populate_in_iter
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 [inline], CPU#1: kworker/1:3/5070
WARNING: net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 at ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x6634/0x6810
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3159, CPU#1: kworker/1:3/5070
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ceph_con_workfn+0x1f5/0x14a0 net/ceph/messenger.c:1575
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3322 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa8e/0x14e0 kernel/workqueue.c:3405
worker_thread+0xa47/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3486
kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
According to the msgr2 protocol specification, the banner payload is
expected to contain at least two 64-bit integers (`server_feat` and
`server_req_feat`). Therefore, `payload_len` must be at least 16 bytes.
Fix this by adding a check in `process_banner_prefix()` to reject a
`payload_len` smaller than 16 bytes. This prevents the 0-length read and
correctly aborts the connection with a protocol error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sfq: clamp quantum to avoid signed overflow soft lockup
sfq_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) (unsigned). A
device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU
2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000, so slot->allot = INT_MIN
and INT_MIN + INT_MIN toggles between INT_MIN and 0 forever, spinning
sfq_dequeue() under the qdisc lock.
Clamp the quantum to [256, 1 << 20] so the refill loop terminates. The
lower bound also covers q->quantum == 0 (psched_mtu() returning 0),
which spins sfq_dequeue() identically. sfq_change() already rejects a
negative quantum, so only the init path was exposed.
Conditions to recreate the bug: a device whose MTU (plus
hard_header_len) wraps psched_mtu() into the sign bit (e.g. a dummy
device with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634). Requires
CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: hhf: clamp quantum before hhf_change() to avoid overflow
hhf_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) with no overflow
check. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting
MTU 2147483634) makes weight * quantum overflow the signed deficit in
hhf_dequeue(), spinning forever.
Clamp q->quantum before hhf_change() so both the opt and !opt paths see
a sane quantum. Without this, bare "tc qdisc add ... hhf" succeeds with
a clamped quantum but "tc qdisc add ... hhf limit 1000" (any option
present) fails with -EINVAL because hhf_change() re-validates the
unclamped default (sch_hhf.c:559). 256 matches fq_codel's floor and is
a sane minimum for a DRR quantum.
Conditions to recreate the bug: a device whose MTU (plus
hard_header_len) wraps psched_mtu() into the sign bit (e.g. a dummy
device with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634). Requires
CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: fq_pie: clamp default quantum to avoid signed overflow
fq_pie_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) without
clamping. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0
accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000, which
overflows the signed flow->deficit to INT_MIN in fq_pie_qdisc_dequeue(),
causing an infinite loop and soft lockup. Emulate fq_pie_policy which
is already bounded to [1, 1 << 20]; clamp the default to [256, 1 << 20].
256 matches fq_codel's floor and is a sane minimum for a DRR quantum.
Conditions to recreate the bug: a device whose MTU (plus
hard_header_len) wraps psched_mtu() into the sign bit (e.g. a dummy
device with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634). Requires
CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fix a resource leak in copy_net_ns() error handling path
Currently, preinit_net() does two things:
(1) call ns_common_init() which might fail
(2) initialize resources which does not fail
However, preinit_net() is returning early when (1) fails, and copy_net_ns()
is jumping to the dec_ucounts: label. As a result, resources allocated by
net_alloc() are leaking. We need to call key_remove_domain() and
net_passive_dec() in order to release resources allocated by net_alloc().
We cannot simply jump to the put_userns: label when preinit_net() failed,
for (2) is not yet done. But we can reorder (1) and (2), for there is no
dependency between (1) and (2). Therefore, this patch decouples (1) from
preinit_net() and changes preinit_net() back to a void function, and calls
ns_common_init() after preinit_net() succeeded. Then, we can jump to
immediately after ns_common_free() of the put_userns: label. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: process: Fix context switching MTE store-only tag check
SCTLR_EL1.TCSO0 is set when user opt-in for MTE store-only tag check
mode. However, it is not part of SCTLR_USER_MASK which imply that on
context switch we never clear SCTLR_EL1.TCSO0, so we are leaking that
setting into another task.
Fix that by including SCTLR_EL1_TCSO0_MASK into SCTLR_USER_MASK |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ptp: netc: fix period truncation and potential divide-by-zero in PEROUT
The max_period bound in net_timer_enable_perout() was computed as:
max_period = (u64)NETC_TMR_DEFAULT_FIPER + integral_period;
which exceeds U32_MAX when integral_period > 0 (e.g. 0x100000002 for
the default 333333333 Hz clock). A period_ns that passes this check but
exceeds U32_MAX is then silently truncated when stored into the u32
struct netc_pp::period field.
A truncated value of zero can reach netc_timer_set_perout_alarm(), where
the local u32 period variable would also be 0, causing a divide-by-zero
in roundup_u64(delta, period) whenever the stime < min_time branch is
taken (which always happens for a start time of {0, 0}).
Additionally, netc_timer_enable_periodic_pulse() and
netc_timer_enable_fiper() both compute:
fiper = pp->period - integral_period;
A zero pp->period results in an unsigned wraparound to 0xFFFFFFFD,
mis-programming the FIPER hardware register.
Fix all three issues by capping max_period at NETC_TMR_DEFAULT_FIPER
(0xFFFFFFFF). This ensures that any period_ns passing the range check
fits in a u32 without truncation, so the stored value is always valid
and non-zero. The accepted range is reduced by integral_period ns
(typically only a few nanoseconds), which is negligible in practice. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4/pnfs: key the data server cache on the NFS version
nfs4_pnfs_ds_add() keys the per-net data server cache on the multipath
address set alone, and struct nfs4_pnfs_ds records no version. That
suffices for the files layout driver, which always connects with version
4, but flexfiles takes its version tuple from GETDEVICEINFO per device,
and one address can legitimately serve both NFSv3 and NFSv4.
Two deviceids on one address with different ds_versions[0].version
therefore share a single nfs4_pnfs_ds, and whichever mirror connects
first pins ds_clp to its own version. The other one is handed that
client anyway, so it selects rpc_call_ops for a version the connection
does not speak, and the mismatched sequence-slot handling dereferences
NULL.
Add the version to the cache key so the two cannot alias, giving each
version its own nfs4_pnfs_ds and connection while both mirrors stay
usable. Only the major version is compared, since that is what selects
rpc_call_ops and rpc_ops; v4.0 and v4.1 keep sharing a client. The files
layout driver passes the 4 it already hardcodes at connect time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: free stashed qentry before overwrite in REQ_ADD_LINK to ADD_LINK transition
When smc_llc_event_handler() transitions the local LLC flow from
SMC_LLC_FLOW_REQ_ADD_LINK to SMC_LLC_FLOW_ADD_LINK on arrival of an ADD_LINK
request, it calls smc_llc_flow_qentry_set() unconditionally:
if (lgr->llc_flow_lcl.type == SMC_LLC_FLOW_REQ_ADD_LINK) {
lgr->llc_flow_lcl.type = SMC_LLC_FLOW_ADD_LINK;
smc_llc_flow_qentry_set(&lgr->llc_flow_lcl, qentry);
...
}
A CONFIRM_LINK or ADD_LINK_CONT arriving while flow->type is
SMC_LLC_FLOW_REQ_ADD_LINK is stashed into flow->qentry via the
SMC_LLC_CONFIRM_LINK / SMC_LLC_ADD_LINK_CONT handler (which stores into
flow->qentry for any non-NONE flow type). When the subsequent ADD_LINK
arrives, the REQ_ADD_LINK branch overwrites flow->qentry with the new pointer
without first freeing the stashed allocation, leaking one kmalloc object.
The stashed entry has no consumer: smc_llc_wait() is only called from
llc_add_link_work, which is not yet scheduled while the flow type remains
REQ_ADD_LINK. No waiter is sleeping on llc_msg_waiter at this point.
It is safe to unconditionally free any stashed qentry before
the overwrite.
Call smc_llc_flow_qentry_del() before smc_llc_flow_qentry_set() in the
REQ_ADD_LINK branch. smc_llc_flow_qentry_del() already checks flow->qentry
before freeing, so the normal path where no entry is stashed is a no-op. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vdpa/mlx5: fix wrong list iterated in add_direct_chain error path
In add_direct_chain(), newly allocated direct MR entries are added to
the local list 'tmp', which is spliced into mr->head only on success.
On the error path, the cleanup loop was incorrectly iterating over
mr->head instead of tmp.
Fix by iterating over 'tmp' in the err_alloc cleanup path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: check for NULL root inode in fuse_fill_super_submount
fuse_iget() can return NULL when its inode allocation fails, but
fuse_fill_super_submount() passed the result straight to get_fuse_inode()
and decremented fi->nlookup without checking it:
root = fuse_iget(sb, parent_fi->nodeid, ...);
fi = get_fuse_inode(root);
fi->nlookup--;
Inside fuse_iget() the inode allocation can fail and return NULL. The
submount root takes the iget5_locked() path, whose alloc_inode() can fail
under memory pressure (the auto-submount branch can fail the same way in
new_inode() or fuse_alloc_submount_lookup()):
inode = iget5_locked(sb, nodeid, fuse_inode_eq, fuse_inode_set,
&nodeid);
if (!inode)
return NULL;
A NULL root makes get_fuse_inode() a container_of() on NULL and the
nlookup decrement a write to a bogus address, oopsing the mount. With
CONFIG_KASAN the following null pointer dereference is reported when the
root inode allocation of an auto-submount fails (e.g. under memory
pressure):
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in fuse_get_tree_submount+0x656/0x8b0
Read of size 8 at addr 00000000000002b0 by task ls/942
CPU: 0 PID: 942 Comm: ls Tainted: G W 6.6 #15
Call Trace:
<TASK>
fuse_get_tree_submount+0x656/0x8b0
vfs_get_tree+0x48/0x140
fc_mount+0x13/0x50
fuse_dentry_automount+0x7a/0xb0
__traverse_mounts+0xca/0x330
step_into+0x339/0xac0
path_lookupat+0xc5/0x2f0
filename_lookup+0x163/0x2a0
vfs_statx+0xd5/0x200
do_statx+0x83/0xd0
__x64_sys_statx+0xa0/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2
</TASK>
==================================================================
Return -ENOMEM instead; the caller tears down the partially built
superblock on error, matching the other error returns in this
function. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/bpf: Replace ly instruction with llgf
cpu_nr is a 32 bit value and BPF_REG_0 is a 64 bit register, when ly loads
the cpu_nr into BPF_REG_0 it does not zero the upper bits, but llgf does. |
| LMDeploy is a toolkit for compressing, deploying, and serving large language models. Starting in version 0.9.2 and prior to version 0.16.0, LMDeploy's PyTorch DistServe/PD-disaggregation control plane used `recv_pyobj()` to deserialize messages received through a ZeroMQ PULL socket. PyZMQ implements `recv_pyobj()` using Python pickle deserialization, which can execute arbitrary code while reconstructing an object. The peer address used by the receiver was supplied through the `POST /distserve/p2p_connect` HTTP endpoint. An attacker who could reach an affected DistServe API server could cause the server to connect to an attacker-controlled ZeroMQ endpoint and deserialize a crafted pickle payload. API-key authentication is not enabled unless the operator explicitly configures it. As a result, affected DistServe deployments without API keys allowed unauthenticated remote code execution with the privileges of the LMDeploy serving process. This issue affects the PyTorch backend when PD-disaggregation/DistServe is enabled. Ordinary deployments that do not use the affected disaggregated-serving path do not expose this data flow. The fix was released in LMDeploy 0.16.0. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should prevent untrusted clients from reaching `/distserve/*` endpoints, restrict the DistServe HTTP and ZeroMQ control planes to trusted cluster networks, configure API-key authentication, and block arbitrary outbound ZeroMQ connections from serving nodes. These measures reduce exposure but do not make pickle deserialization safe. |
| PJSIP is a free and open source multimedia communication library written in C. In 2.17 and earlier, the OpenSSL and GnuTLS backends in pjlib/src/pj/ssl_sock_ossl.c and pjlib/src/pj/ssl_sock_gtls.c copy DNS SubjectAltName values with string functions that recalculate their length and truncate an embedded NUL byte. With server verification enabled through --tls-verify-server for the PJSIP TLS/SIPS transport, a certificate containing a DNS SubjectAltName formed from the target hostname prefix followed by an embedded NUL and an attacker-controlled suffix can therefore be accepted for the prefix hostname. An attacker who possesses such a certificate from a trusted issuer and can intercept the connection can impersonate the target server, complete the SIP session, and receive REGISTER credentials. The mbedTLS backend is not affected because it preserves the explicit string length. No fixed version is available as of this review. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: fix off-by-one page overflow in ntfs_decompress()
The per-token range check in ntfs_decompress() uses
if (cb >= cb_sb_end || dp_addr > dp_sb_end)
break;
so dp_addr == dp_sb_end falls through to the symbol copy
`*dp_addr++ = *cb++`, writing one byte past the destination page. Since
NTFS_SB_SIZE == PAGE_SIZE the destination is a single page, so the byte
lands in the adjacent page, and *dest_ofs is left one past the sub-block
end (the later `*dest_ofs &= ~PAGE_MASK` then yields 1, not 0, so the page
is never finalized and later sub-blocks keep writing further past it). A
corrupted compressed $DATA attribute thus produces a bounded run of
out-of-bounds writes when the file is read.
Break as soon as dp_addr reaches dp_sb_end; a full sub-block still
completes, as its final copy advances dp_addr to exactly dp_sb_end. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: visconti: Make sure clk_init_data is fully initialized
The clk_init_data structure contains several mutually-exclusive members
for different methods to specify the possible parents of a clock,
prompting drivers to initialize only the members they need. However,
not initializing all members may cause subtle issues, which are only
exposed when CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN or CONFIG_INIT_STACK_NONE is
enabled.
visconti_clk_register_gate() fills in init.parent_data, and assumes that
init.parent_names is NULL. However, the latter in uninitialized, and
thus may cause a crash.
Make sure all members are fully initialized, to fix such bugs, and to
avoid future breakage when converting drivers to a different method for
specifying the parents. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rtc: pcf8563: fix clock provider leak on unbind
pcf8563_clkout_register_clk() registers the CLKOUT clock provider with
of_clk_add_provider(), but nothing ever unwinds it: there is no
of_clk_del_provider() call and the driver has no remove callback. Each
of_clk_add_provider() allocates a struct of_clk_provider, takes a
reference on the OF node and adds an entry to the global of_clk_providers
list, none of which is released when the device is unbound. Every
bind/unbind (or module reload) therefore leaks a provider structure and
an of_node reference.
The clock itself is already device-managed (devm_clk_register()); only
the provider registration was not. Use devm_of_clk_add_hw_provider() so
the provider is removed automatically on unbind. Tie it to the parent
i2c device, whose OF node carries the #clock-cells and clock-output-names
properties (the RTC class device has no OF node of its own). |
