| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: fix session state check in reconnect to avoid use-after-free issue
Don't collect exiting session in smb2_reconnect_server(), because it
will be released soon.
Note that the exiting session will stay in server->smb_ses_list until
it complete the cifs_free_ipc() and logoff() and then delete itself
from the list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: ISO: fix iso_conn related locking and validity issues
sk->sk_state indicates whether iso_pi(sk)->conn is valid. Operations
that check/update sk_state and access conn should hold lock_sock,
otherwise they can race.
The order of taking locks is hci_dev_lock > lock_sock > iso_conn_lock,
which is how it is in connect/disconnect_cfm -> iso_conn_del ->
iso_chan_del.
Fix locking in iso_connect_cis/bis and sendmsg/recvmsg to take lock_sock
around updating sk_state and conn.
iso_conn_del must not occur during iso_connect_cis/bis, as it frees the
iso_conn. Hold hdev->lock longer to prevent that.
This should not reintroduce the issue fixed in commit 241f51931c35
("Bluetooth: ISO: Avoid circular locking dependency"), since the we
acquire locks in order. We retain the fix in iso_sock_connect to release
lock_sock before iso_connect_* acquires hdev->lock.
Similarly for commit 6a5ad251b7cd ("Bluetooth: ISO: Fix possible
circular locking dependency"). We retain the fix in iso_conn_ready to
not acquire iso_conn_lock before lock_sock.
iso_conn_add shall return iso_conn with valid hcon. Make it so also when
reusing an old CIS connection waiting for disconnect timeout (see
__iso_sock_close where conn->hcon is set to NULL).
Trace with iso_conn_del after iso_chan_add in iso_connect_cis:
===============================================================
iso_sock_create:771: sock 00000000be9b69b7
iso_sock_init:693: sk 000000004dff667e
iso_sock_bind:827: sk 000000004dff667e 70:1a:b8:98:ff:a2 type 1
iso_sock_setsockopt:1289: sk 000000004dff667e
iso_sock_setsockopt:1289: sk 000000004dff667e
iso_sock_setsockopt:1289: sk 000000004dff667e
iso_sock_connect:875: sk 000000004dff667e
iso_connect_cis:353: 70:1a:b8:98:ff:a2 -> 28:3d:c2:4a:7e:da
hci_get_route:1199: 70:1a:b8:98:ff:a2 -> 28:3d:c2:4a:7e:da
hci_conn_add:1005: hci0 dst 28:3d:c2:4a:7e:da
iso_conn_add:140: hcon 000000007b65d182 conn 00000000daf8625e
__iso_chan_add:214: conn 00000000daf8625e
iso_connect_cfm:1700: hcon 000000007b65d182 bdaddr 28:3d:c2:4a:7e:da status 12
iso_conn_del:187: hcon 000000007b65d182 conn 00000000daf8625e, err 16
iso_sock_clear_timer:117: sock 000000004dff667e state 3
<Note: sk_state is BT_BOUND (3), so iso_connect_cis is still
running at this point>
iso_chan_del:153: sk 000000004dff667e, conn 00000000daf8625e, err 16
hci_conn_del:1151: hci0 hcon 000000007b65d182 handle 65535
hci_conn_unlink:1102: hci0: hcon 000000007b65d182
hci_chan_list_flush:2780: hcon 000000007b65d182
iso_sock_getsockopt:1376: sk 000000004dff667e
iso_sock_getname:1070: sock 00000000be9b69b7, sk 000000004dff667e
iso_sock_getname:1070: sock 00000000be9b69b7, sk 000000004dff667e
iso_sock_getsockopt:1376: sk 000000004dff667e
iso_sock_getname:1070: sock 00000000be9b69b7, sk 000000004dff667e
iso_sock_getname:1070: sock 00000000be9b69b7, sk 000000004dff667e
iso_sock_shutdown:1434: sock 00000000be9b69b7, sk 000000004dff667e, how 1
__iso_sock_close:632: sk 000000004dff667e state 5 socket 00000000be9b69b7
<Note: sk_state is BT_CONNECT (5), even though iso_chan_del sets
BT_CLOSED (6). Only iso_connect_cis sets it to BT_CONNECT, so it
must be that iso_chan_del occurred between iso_chan_add and end of
iso_connect_cis.>
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
PGD 8000000006467067 P4D 8000000006467067 PUD 3f5f067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__iso_sock_close (net/bluetooth/iso.c:664) bluetooth
===============================================================
Trace with iso_conn_del before iso_chan_add in iso_connect_cis:
===============================================================
iso_connect_cis:356: 70:1a:b8:98:ff:a2 -> 28:3d:c2:4a:7e:da
...
iso_conn_add:140: hcon 0000000093bc551f conn 00000000768ae504
hci_dev_put:1487: hci0 orig refcnt 21
hci_event_packet:7607: hci0: e
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix information leak in f2fs_move_inline_dirents()
When converting an inline directory to a regular one, f2fs is leaking
uninitialized memory to disk because it doesn't initialize the entire
directory block. Fix this by zero-initializing the block.
This bug was introduced by commit 4ec17d688d74 ("f2fs: avoid unneeded
initializing when converting inline dentry"), which didn't consider the
security implications of leaking uninitialized memory to disk.
This was found by running xfstest generic/435 on a KMSAN-enabled kernel. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: gs_usb: gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): check actual_length before accessing header
The driver expects to receive a struct gs_host_frame in
gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback().
Use struct_group to describe the header of the struct gs_host_frame and
check that we have at least received the header before accessing any
members of it.
To resubmit the URB, do not dereference the pointer chain
"dev->parent->hf_size_rx" but use "parent->hf_size_rx" instead. Since
"urb->context" contains "parent", it is always defined, while "dev" is not
defined if the URB it too short. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: gs_usb: gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): check actual_length before accessing data
The URB received in gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback() contains a struct
gs_host_frame. The length of the data after the header depends on the
gs_host_frame hf::flags and the active device features (e.g. time
stamping).
Introduce a new function gs_usb_get_minimum_length() and check that we have
at least received the required amount of data before accessing it. Only
copy the data to that skb that has actually been received.
[mkl: rename gs_usb_get_minimum_length() -> +gs_usb_get_minimum_rx_length()] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: tag_8021q: avoid leaking ctx on dsa_tag_8021q_register() error path
If dsa_tag_8021q_setup() fails, for example due to the inability of the
device to install a VLAN, the tag_8021q context of the switch will leak.
Make sure it is freed on the error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
atm/fore200e: Fix possible data race in fore200e_open()
Protect access to fore200e->available_cell_rate with rate_mtx lock in the
error handling path of fore200e_open() to prevent a data race.
The field fore200e->available_cell_rate is a shared resource used to track
available bandwidth. It is concurrently accessed by fore200e_open(),
fore200e_close(), and fore200e_change_qos().
In fore200e_open(), the lock rate_mtx is correctly held when subtracting
vcc->qos.txtp.max_pcr from available_cell_rate to reserve bandwidth.
However, if the subsequent call to fore200e_activate_vcin() fails, the
function restores the reserved bandwidth by adding back to
available_cell_rate without holding the lock.
This introduces a race condition because available_cell_rate is a global
device resource shared across all VCCs. If the error path in
fore200e_open() executes concurrently with operations like
fore200e_close() or fore200e_change_qos() on other VCCs, a
read-modify-write race occurs.
Specifically, the error path reads the rate without the lock. If another
CPU acquires the lock and modifies the rate (e.g., releasing bandwidth in
fore200e_close()) between this read and the subsequent write, the error
path will overwrite the concurrent update with a stale value. This results
in incorrect bandwidth accounting. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/irdma: Cap MSIX used to online CPUs + 1
The irdma driver can use a maximum number of msix vectors equal
to num_online_cpus() + 1 and the kernel warning stack below is shown
if that number is exceeded.
The kernel throws a warning as the driver tries to update the affinity
hint with a CPU mask greater than the max CPU IDs. Fix this by capping
the MSIX vectors to num_online_cpus() + 1.
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 23655 at include/linux/cpumask.h:106 irdma_cfg_ceq_vector+0x34c/0x3f0 [irdma]
RIP: 0010:irdma_cfg_ceq_vector+0x34c/0x3f0 [irdma]
Call Trace:
irdma_rt_init_hw+0xa62/0x1290 [irdma]
? irdma_alloc_local_mac_entry+0x1a0/0x1a0 [irdma]
? __is_kernel_percpu_address+0x63/0x310
? rcu_read_lock_held_common+0xe/0xb0
? irdma_lan_unregister_qset+0x280/0x280 [irdma]
? irdma_request_reset+0x80/0x80 [irdma]
? ice_get_qos_params+0x84/0x390 [ice]
irdma_probe+0xa40/0xfc0 [irdma]
? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xd0/0xd0
? irdma_remove+0x140/0x140 [irdma]
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x62/0xe0
? down_write+0x187/0x3d0
? auxiliary_match_id+0xf0/0x1a0
? irdma_remove+0x140/0x140 [irdma]
auxiliary_bus_probe+0xa6/0x100
__driver_probe_device+0x4a4/0xd50
? __device_attach_driver+0x2c0/0x2c0
driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x110
__driver_attach+0x1aa/0x350
bus_for_each_dev+0x11d/0x1b0
? subsys_dev_iter_init+0xe0/0xe0
bus_add_driver+0x3b1/0x610
driver_register+0x18e/0x410
? 0xffffffffc0b88000
irdma_init_module+0x50/0xaa [irdma]
do_one_initcall+0x103/0x5f0
? perf_trace_initcall_level+0x420/0x420
? do_init_module+0x4e/0x700
? __kasan_kmalloc+0x7d/0xa0
? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x188/0x2b0
? kasan_unpoison+0x21/0x50
do_init_module+0x1d1/0x700
load_module+0x3867/0x5260
? layout_and_allocate+0x3990/0x3990
? rcu_read_lock_held_common+0xe/0xb0
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x62/0xe0
? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xd0/0xd0
? __vmalloc_node_range+0x46b/0x890
? lock_release+0x5c8/0xba0
? alloc_vm_area+0x120/0x120
? selinux_kernel_module_from_file+0x2a5/0x300
? __inode_security_revalidate+0xf0/0xf0
? __do_sys_init_module+0x1db/0x260
__do_sys_init_module+0x1db/0x260
? load_module+0x5260/0x5260
? do_syscall_64+0x22/0x450
do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x450
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x66/0xdb |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ARM: zynq: Fix refcount leak in zynq_early_slcr_init
of_find_compatible_node() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented,
we should use of_node_put() on error path.
Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
loop: loop_set_status_from_info() check before assignment
In loop_set_status_from_info(), lo->lo_offset and lo->lo_sizelimit should
be checked before reassignment, because if an overflow error occurs, the
original correct value will be changed to the wrong value, and it will not
be changed back.
More, the original patch did not solve the problem, the value was set and
ioctl returned an error, but the subsequent io used the value in the loop
driver, which still caused an alarm:
loop_handle_cmd
do_req_filebacked
loff_t pos = ((loff_t) blk_rq_pos(rq) << 9) + lo->lo_offset;
lo_rw_aio
cmd->iocb.ki_pos = pos |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: fix potential use-after-free in have_mon_and_osd_map()
The wait loop in __ceph_open_session() can race with the client
receiving a new monmap or osdmap shortly after the initial map is
received. Both ceph_monc_handle_map() and handle_one_map() install
a new map immediately after freeing the old one
kfree(monc->monmap);
monc->monmap = monmap;
ceph_osdmap_destroy(osdc->osdmap);
osdc->osdmap = newmap;
under client->monc.mutex and client->osdc.lock respectively, but
because neither is taken in have_mon_and_osd_map() it's possible for
client->monc.monmap->epoch and client->osdc.osdmap->epoch arms in
client->monc.monmap && client->monc.monmap->epoch &&
client->osdc.osdmap && client->osdc.osdmap->epoch;
condition to dereference an already freed map. This happens to be
reproducible with generic/395 and generic/397 with KASAN enabled:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in have_mon_and_osd_map+0x56/0x70
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811012d810 by task mount.ceph/13305
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 13305 Comm: mount.ceph Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2-build2+ #1266
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
have_mon_and_osd_map+0x56/0x70
ceph_open_session+0x182/0x290
ceph_get_tree+0x333/0x680
vfs_get_tree+0x49/0x180
do_new_mount+0x1a3/0x2d0
path_mount+0x6dd/0x730
do_mount+0x99/0xe0
__do_sys_mount+0x141/0x180
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
Allocated by task 13305:
ceph_osdmap_alloc+0x16/0x130
ceph_osdc_init+0x27a/0x4c0
ceph_create_client+0x153/0x190
create_fs_client+0x50/0x2a0
ceph_get_tree+0xff/0x680
vfs_get_tree+0x49/0x180
do_new_mount+0x1a3/0x2d0
path_mount+0x6dd/0x730
do_mount+0x99/0xe0
__do_sys_mount+0x141/0x180
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Freed by task 9475:
kfree+0x212/0x290
handle_one_map+0x23c/0x3b0
ceph_osdc_handle_map+0x3c9/0x590
mon_dispatch+0x655/0x6f0
ceph_con_process_message+0xc3/0xe0
ceph_con_v1_try_read+0x614/0x760
ceph_con_workfn+0x2de/0x650
process_one_work+0x486/0x7c0
process_scheduled_works+0x73/0x90
worker_thread+0x1c8/0x2a0
kthread+0x2ec/0x300
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x40
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Rewrite the wait loop to check the above condition directly with
client->monc.mutex and client->osdc.lock taken as appropriate. While
at it, improve the timeout handling (previously mount_timeout could be
exceeded in case wait_event_interruptible_timeout() slept more than
once) and access client->auth_err under client->monc.mutex to match
how it's set in finish_auth().
monmap_show() and osdmap_show() now take the respective lock before
accessing the map as well. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block/rq_qos: protect rq_qos apis with a new lock
commit 50e34d78815e ("block: disable the elevator int del_gendisk")
move rq_qos_exit() from disk_release() to del_gendisk(), this will
introduce some problems:
1) If rq_qos_add() is triggered by enabling iocost/iolatency through
cgroupfs, then it can concurrent with del_gendisk(), it's not safe to
write 'q->rq_qos' concurrently.
2) Activate cgroup policy that is relied on rq_qos will call
rq_qos_add() and blkcg_activate_policy(), and if rq_qos_exit() is
called in the middle, null-ptr-dereference will be triggered in
blkcg_activate_policy().
3) blkg_conf_open_bdev() can call blkdev_get_no_open() first to find the
disk, then if rq_qos_exit() from del_gendisk() is done before
rq_qos_add(), then memory will be leaked.
This patch add a new disk level mutex 'rq_qos_mutex':
1) The lock will protect rq_qos_exit() directly.
2) For wbt that doesn't relied on blk-cgroup, rq_qos_add() can only be
called from disk initialization for now because wbt can't be
destructed until rq_qos_exit(), so it's safe not to protect wbt for
now. Hoever, in case that rq_qos dynamically destruction is supported
in the furture, this patch also protect rq_qos_add() from wbt_init()
directly, this is enough because blk-sysfs already synchronize
writers with disk removal.
3) For iocost and iolatency, in order to synchronize disk removal and
cgroup configuration, the lock is held after blkdev_get_no_open()
from blkg_conf_open_bdev(), and is released in blkg_conf_exit().
In order to fix the above memory leak, disk_live() is checked after
holding the new lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netlink: annotate lockless accesses to nlk->max_recvmsg_len
syzbot reported a data-race in data-race in netlink_recvmsg() [1]
Indeed, netlink_recvmsg() can be run concurrently,
and netlink_dump() also needs protection.
[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in netlink_recvmsg / netlink_recvmsg
read to 0xffff888141840b38 of 8 bytes by task 23057 on cpu 0:
netlink_recvmsg+0xea/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1988
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1017 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1038 [inline]
__sys_recvfrom+0x1ee/0x2e0 net/socket.c:2194
__do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2212 [inline]
__se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2208 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvfrom+0x78/0x90 net/socket.c:2208
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
write to 0xffff888141840b38 of 8 bytes by task 23037 on cpu 1:
netlink_recvmsg+0x114/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1989
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1017 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1038 [inline]
____sys_recvmsg+0x156/0x310 net/socket.c:2720
___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2762 [inline]
do_recvmmsg+0x2e5/0x710 net/socket.c:2856
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2935 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2958 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2951 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xe2/0x160 net/socket.c:2951
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
value changed: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000000001000
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 23037 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc4-syzkaller-00195-g5a57b48fdfcb #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/02/2023 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: Avoid use-after-free in dbg for hci_add_adv_monitor()
KSAN reports use-after-free in hci_add_adv_monitor().
While adding an adv monitor,
hci_add_adv_monitor() calls ->
msft_add_monitor_pattern() calls ->
msft_add_monitor_sync() calls ->
msft_le_monitor_advertisement_cb() calls in an error case ->
hci_free_adv_monitor() which frees the *moniter.
This is referenced by bt_dev_dbg() in hci_add_adv_monitor().
Fix the bt_dev_dbg() by using handle instead of monitor->handle. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: ina2xx: avoid NULL pointer dereference on OF device match
The affected lines were resulting in a NULL pointer dereference on our
platform because the device tree contained the following list of
compatible strings:
power-sensor@40 {
compatible = "ti,ina232", "ti,ina231";
...
};
Since the driver doesn't declare a compatible string "ti,ina232", the OF
matching succeeds on "ti,ina231". But the I2C device ID info is
populated via the first compatible string, cf. modalias population in
of_i2c_get_board_info(). Since there is no "ina232" entry in the legacy
I2C device ID table either, the struct i2c_device_id *id pointer in the
probe function is NULL.
Fix this by using the already populated type variable instead, which
points to the proper driver data. Since the name is also wanted, add a
generic one to the ina2xx_config table. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm: fix NULL-deref on snapshot tear down
In case of early initialisation errors and on platforms that do not use
the DPU controller, the deinitilisation code can be called with the kms
pointer set to NULL.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/525099/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: reject negative ifindex
Recent changes in net-next (commit 759ab1edb56c ("net: store netdevs
in an xarray")) refactored the handling of pre-assigned ifindexes
and let syzbot surface a latent problem in ovs. ovs does not validate
ifindex, making it possible to create netdev ports with negative
ifindex values. It's easy to repro with YNL:
$ ./cli.py --spec netlink/specs/ovs_datapath.yaml \
--do new \
--json '{"upcall-pid": 1, "name":"my-dp"}'
$ ./cli.py --spec netlink/specs/ovs_vport.yaml \
--do new \
--json '{"upcall-pid": "00000001", "name": "some-port0", "dp-ifindex":3,"ifindex":4294901760,"type":2}'
$ ip link show
-65536: some-port0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN mode DEFAULT group default qlen 1000
link/ether 7a:48:21:ad:0b:fb brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
...
Validate the inputs. Now the second command correctly returns:
$ ./cli.py --spec netlink/specs/ovs_vport.yaml \
--do new \
--json '{"upcall-pid": "00000001", "name": "some-port0", "dp-ifindex":3,"ifindex":4294901760,"type":2}'
lib.ynl.NlError: Netlink error: Numerical result out of range
nl_len = 108 (92) nl_flags = 0x300 nl_type = 2
error: -34 extack: {'msg': 'integer out of range', 'unknown': [[type:4 len:36] b'\x0c\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0c\x00\x03\x00\xff\xff\xff\x7f\x00\x00\x00\x00\x08\x00\x01\x00\x08\x00\x00\x00'], 'bad-attr': '.ifindex'}
Accept 0 since it used to be silently ignored. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to do sanity check on direct node in truncate_dnode()
syzbot reports below bug:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in f2fs_truncate_data_blocks_range+0x122a/0x14c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:574
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88802a25c000 by task syz-executor148/5000
CPU: 1 PID: 5000 Comm: syz-executor148 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-syzkaller-00041-ge660abd551f1 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0 mm/kasan/report.c:351
print_report mm/kasan/report.c:462 [inline]
kasan_report+0x11c/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:572
f2fs_truncate_data_blocks_range+0x122a/0x14c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:574
truncate_dnode+0x229/0x2e0 fs/f2fs/node.c:944
f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks+0x64b/0xde0 fs/f2fs/node.c:1154
f2fs_do_truncate_blocks+0x4ac/0xf30 fs/f2fs/file.c:721
f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x7b/0x300 fs/f2fs/file.c:749
f2fs_truncate.part.0+0x4a5/0x630 fs/f2fs/file.c:799
f2fs_truncate include/linux/fs.h:825 [inline]
f2fs_setattr+0x1738/0x2090 fs/f2fs/file.c:1006
notify_change+0xb2c/0x1180 fs/attr.c:483
do_truncate+0x143/0x200 fs/open.c:66
handle_truncate fs/namei.c:3295 [inline]
do_open fs/namei.c:3640 [inline]
path_openat+0x2083/0x2750 fs/namei.c:3791
do_filp_open+0x1ba/0x410 fs/namei.c:3818
do_sys_openat2+0x16d/0x4c0 fs/open.c:1356
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1372 [inline]
__do_sys_creat fs/open.c:1448 [inline]
__se_sys_creat fs/open.c:1442 [inline]
__x64_sys_creat+0xcd/0x120 fs/open.c:1442
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The root cause is, inodeA references inodeB via inodeB's ino, once inodeA
is truncated, it calls truncate_dnode() to truncate data blocks in inodeB's
node page, it traverse mapping data from node->i.i_addr[0] to
node->i.i_addr[ADDRS_PER_BLOCK() - 1], result in out-of-boundary access.
This patch fixes to add sanity check on dnode page in truncate_dnode(),
so that, it can help to avoid triggering such issue, and once it encounters
such issue, it will record newly introduced ERROR_INVALID_NODE_REFERENCE
error into superblock, later fsck can detect such issue and try repairing.
Also, it removes f2fs_truncate_data_blocks() for cleanup due to the
function has only one caller, and uses f2fs_truncate_data_blocks_range()
instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: don't log conflicting inode if it's a dir moved in the current transaction
We can't log a conflicting inode if it's a directory and it was moved
from one parent directory to another parent directory in the current
transaction, as this can result an attempt to have a directory with
two hard links during log replay, one for the old parent directory and
another for the new parent directory.
The following scenario triggers that issue:
1) We have directories "dir1" and "dir2" created in a past transaction.
Directory "dir1" has inode A as its parent directory;
2) We move "dir1" to some other directory;
3) We create a file with the name "dir1" in directory inode A;
4) We fsync the new file. This results in logging the inode of the new file
and the inode for the directory "dir1" that was previously moved in the
current transaction. So the log tree has the INODE_REF item for the
new location of "dir1";
5) We move the new file to some other directory. This results in updating
the log tree to included the new INODE_REF for the new location of the
file and removes the INODE_REF for the old location. This happens
during the rename when we call btrfs_log_new_name();
6) We fsync the file, and that persists the log tree changes done in the
previous step (btrfs_log_new_name() only updates the log tree in
memory);
7) We have a power failure;
8) Next time the fs is mounted, log replay happens and when processing
the inode for directory "dir1" we find a new INODE_REF and add that
link, but we don't remove the old link of the inode since we have
not logged the old parent directory of the directory inode "dir1".
As a result after log replay finishes when we trigger writeback of the
subvolume tree's extent buffers, the tree check will detect that we have
a directory a hard link count of 2 and we get a mount failure.
The errors and stack traces reported in dmesg/syslog are like this:
[ 3845.729764] BTRFS info (device dm-0): start tree-log replay
[ 3845.730304] page: refcount:3 mapcount:0 mapping:000000005c8a3027 index:0x1d00 pfn:0x11510c
[ 3845.731236] memcg:ffff9264c02f4e00
[ 3845.731751] aops:btree_aops [btrfs] ino:1
[ 3845.732300] flags: 0x17fffc00000400a(uptodate|private|writeback|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff)
[ 3845.733346] raw: 017fffc00000400a 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff9264d978aea8
[ 3845.734265] raw: 0000000000001d00 ffff92650e6d4738 00000003ffffffff ffff9264c02f4e00
[ 3845.735305] page dumped because: eb page dump
[ 3845.735981] BTRFS critical (device dm-0): corrupt leaf: root=5 block=30408704 slot=6 ino=257, invalid nlink: has 2 expect no more than 1 for dir
[ 3845.737786] BTRFS info (device dm-0): leaf 30408704 gen 10 total ptrs 17 free space 14881 owner 5
[ 3845.737789] BTRFS info (device dm-0): refs 4 lock_owner 0 current 30701
[ 3845.737792] item 0 key (256 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160
[ 3845.737794] inode generation 3 transid 9 size 16 nbytes 16384
[ 3845.737795] block group 0 mode 40755 links 1 uid 0 gid 0
[ 3845.737797] rdev 0 sequence 2 flags 0x0
[ 3845.737798] atime 1764259517.0
[ 3845.737800] ctime 1764259517.572889464
[ 3845.737801] mtime 1764259517.572889464
[ 3845.737802] otime 1764259517.0
[ 3845.737803] item 1 key (256 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16111 itemsize 12
[ 3845.737805] index 0 name_len 2
[ 3845.737807] item 2 key (256 DIR_ITEM 2363071922) itemoff 16077 itemsize 34
[ 3845.737808] location key (257 1 0) type 2
[ 3845.737810] transid 9 data_len 0 name_len 4
[ 3845.737811] item 3 key (256 DIR_ITEM 2676584006) itemoff 16043 itemsize 34
[ 3845.737813] location key (258 1 0) type 2
[ 3845.737814] transid 9 data_len 0 name_len 4
[ 3845.737815] item 4 key (256 DIR_INDEX 2) itemoff 16009 itemsize 34
[ 3845.737816] location key (257 1 0) type 2
[
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb-storage: alauda: Fix uninit-value in alauda_check_media()
Syzbot got KMSAN to complain about access to an uninitialized value in
the alauda subdriver of usb-storage:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in alauda_transport+0x462/0x57f0
drivers/usb/storage/alauda.c:1137
CPU: 0 PID: 12279 Comm: usb-storage Not tainted 5.3.0-rc7+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x191/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x13a/0x2b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:108
__msan_warning+0x73/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:250
alauda_check_media+0x344/0x3310 drivers/usb/storage/alauda.c:460
The problem is that alauda_check_media() doesn't verify that its USB
transfer succeeded before trying to use the received data. What
should happen if the transfer fails isn't entirely clear, but a
reasonably conservative approach is to pretend that no media is
present.
A similar problem exists in a usb_stor_dbg() call in
alauda_get_media_status(). In this case, when an error occurs the
call is redundant, because usb_stor_ctrl_transfer() already will print
a debugging message.
Finally, unrelated to the uninitialized memory access, is the fact
that alauda_check_media() performs DMA to a buffer on the stack.
Fortunately usb-storage provides a general purpose DMA-able buffer for
uses like this. We'll use it instead. |
