| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pds_core: fix cmd_regs access racing BAR unmap on reset
pdsc_reset_prepare() and pdsc_reset_done()'s pdsc_map_bars() error path
clear/iounmap cmd_regs without devcmd_lock, and
pdsc_legacy_firmware_update()'s download loop derefs cmd_regs after
dropping and retaking the lock without re-checking. An FLR concurrent
with a devlink flash can unmap cmd_regs under an in-flight devcmd,
causing a NULL deref or a write to unmapped MMIO.
Take devcmd_lock across the BAR unmap/remap, and re-check cmd_regs in
the download loop. Only the PF maps cmd_regs and runs devcmd, so skip
the unmap on a VF, as pdsc_remove() and pdsc_reset_done() already do.
A reset that completes entirely within the unlocked window is not a
correctness problem for the image: the device clears its update session,
so a resumed download is rejected, and it verifies the staged image
before writing a flash slot, reporting PDS_RC_BAD_FW rather than
activating it.
pdsc_unmap_bars() also clears info_regs, intr_status and intr_ctrl. The
interrupt and start/stop readers of those are quiesced before the unmap
by pdsc_fw_down(), which frees the interrupts and tears down the queues.
The debugfs readers are not, since those files outlive a reset; that is
pre-existing and out of scope here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: reject oversized tx_queue_len at netlink parse time
rtnl_create_link() assigns IFLA_TXQLEN directly to dev->tx_queue_len
without going through netif_change_tx_queue_len(), so a device created
with "ip link add ... txqueuelen 500000" bypasses the S16_MAX cap and
still triggers the oversized ring allocations in pfifo_fast, tun and
tap. The veth peer nest (rtnl_nla_parse_ifinfomsg()) and the
RTM_NEWLINK-on-existing-device path reach the same sinks.
Enforce the cap in ifla_policy instead: IFLA_TXQLEN becomes
NLA_POLICY_FULL_RANGE(NLA_U32, &txqlen_range) with
txqlen_range = { .min = 0, .max = S16_MAX }. All netlink consumers
parse against this policy - rtnl_setlink(), rtnl_newlink() (create
and change), and the veth peer nest - so every netlink path is capped
at parse time and rejects the attribute with -ERANGE plus a proper
"integer out of range" extack message before any device state is
modified (the RTM_SETLINK half-application wart is gone with it).
Document the bound in the rt-link.yaml netlink spec.
Conditions to recreate the bug:
- CONFIG_NET_SCHED=y, CONFIG_VETH=y, CONFIG_USER_NS=y, CONFIG_NET_NS=y.
- Unprivileged user in a fresh user+net namespace (unshare -Urn):
ip link add v0 txqueuelen 500000 type veth peer name v1
-> on the fixed kernel this is rejected with -ERANGE ("integer out
of range" extack) instead of installing an oversized tx_queue_len
that later inflates pfifo_fast/tun/tap ring allocations.
- ip link set v0 txqueuelen 500000 is likewise rejected at parse time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: cap tx_queue_len at S16_MAX to prevent oversized ring allocations
Several subsystems allocate ring buffers sized by dev->tx_queue_len
with no upper bound. An unprivileged user (via unshare -Urn) can set a
huge tx_queue_len and exhaust global memory with ring allocations:
- pfifo_fast: pfifo_fast_init() and pfifo_fast_change_tx_queue_len()
allocate 3 skb_array rings of tx_queue_len entries each.
- tun: tun_queue_resize() and the queue-attach path resize ptr_rings
to tx_queue_len on the NETDEV_CHANGE_TX_QUEUE_LEN notifier.
- tap (macvtap/ipvtap): tap_queue_resize() and tap_init() resize/init
ptr_rings to tx_queue_len on the same notifier.
netif_change_tx_queue_len() is the single entry point for IFLA_TXQLEN,
sysfs, and the SIOCSIFTXQLEN ioctl. Cap new_len at S16_MAX (32767)
there so the oversized value is rejected at set time. This takes
effect whether the device is up or down, before dev->tx_queue_len is
written, before any notifier fires, and before any ring is allocated.
The "> S16_MAX" check also subsumes the previous unsigned-long
truncation test, and a negative ifr_qlen from the ioctl lands far
above the cap after conversion, so both old failure modes are covered
by the one comparison.
tx_queue_len is ambigious: both a per-ring sizing multiplier and a
default queue-length/limit knob for consumers that allocate
nothing at set time (pfifo/bfifo/gred/plug/sfb limits, htb
direct_qlen, qfq max_classes, teql). 32767 is chosen as the largest
value NLA_POLICY_FULL_RANGE can express for the u32 IFLA_TXQLEN
policy in patch 2/3 while staying a legitimate queue length on
high-BDP paths; the ring-memory trade-off of a shared knob is
disclosed below.
Conditions to recreate the bug:
- CONFIG_NET_SCHED=y, CONFIG_VETH=y, CONFIG_USER_NS=y, CONFIG_NET_NS=y.
- Unprivileged user in a fresh user+net namespace (unshare -Urn).
- pfifo_fast: create veth pairs, set tx_queue_len to 500000, attach
mq+pfifo_fast. ~28 iterations OOMs a 2GB guest.
- tun: create 50 tun devices with IFF_MULTI_QUEUE, set tx_queue_len to
500000, open 8 queues each. ~1.6GB of ptr_ring allocations OOMs a
512MB guest.
- tap: same as tun with IFF_TAP. ~960MB OOMs a 512MB guest.
- On the fixed kernel the oversized tx_queue_len is rejected with
-ERANGE at set time (all four paths: RTM_SETLINK, RTM_NEWLINK
create, sysfs, ioctl - the latter two via this check, the former
two via this check and the 2/3 parse policy respectively). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: nfp: drop the replaced rule from the list when reprogramming fails
nfp_net_fs_add() replaces an existing rule by deleting it from the
hardware, decrementing nn->fs.count and programming the new one. If
nfp_net_fs_add_hw() fails the old entry stays on nn->fs.list - only the
success path reaches list_replace() - so the list is one longer than
nn->fs.count, and it advertises a rule whose hardware entry has already
been torn down.
nn->fs.count is what ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLCNT reports, so userspace then sizes
its buffer one entry short of what the GRXCLSRLALL walk wants to write.
That used to overwrite one u32 past the allocation; since the walk is
bounded it is a permanent -EMSGSIZE instead, as nothing ever resyncs the
counter. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix subbuf resize races with trace_pipe_raw readers
Concurrent subbuffer resizes may crash trace_pipe_raw readers or leak
uninitialized memory to userspace due to stale size values.
Modify ring_buffer_alloc_read_page() to handle the resizing of an
existing buffer_data_read_page if necessary and add a new
ring_buffer_read_page_size(). This new function enables ring-buffer
buffer_data_read_page users to not call the racy
ring_buffer_subbuf_size_get(). This makes the spare_size member of
ftrace_buffer_info redundant.
Finally, handle buffer_data_read_page/reader_page order discrepancy in
ring_buffer_read_page(). On a mismatch simply copy manually the data to
the buffer_data_read_page. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Preserve inner map identity in callback frames
Callback frame constructors initialize map-typed argument registers with
__mark_reg_known_zero() and then restore map_ptr. This clears map_uid,
which is the only field distinguishing inner maps that share an
inner_map_meta template.
When a timer callback invokes bpf_for_each_map_elem() on a second inner
map, both the saved first map and the second map value can reach the nested
callback as the same template with map_uid zero. bpf_timer_init() then
accepts pairing the timer from the second map with the first map.
The runtime records the first map in the timer without taking a reference.
Freeing that map does not find the timer stored in the second map, so a
later timer callback dereferences the freed map.
Copy map_uid from the same caller register as map_ptr when constructing
for-each, timer/workqueue, and task-work callback arguments. The existing
identity check can then reject mismatched inner maps while allowing a
callback value to be paired with its actual map. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Preserve special fields in recycled rhtab elements
rhtab_map_update_elem() initializes special fields after obtaining an
element from bpf_mem_cache_alloc(). The allocator can return a fresh,
zeroed unit, or recycle one from its RCU-pending lists before the
registered destructor has run.
A BPF program can retain a map-value pointer after deleting its element
and initialize and arm a timer through that pointer. If the deleted unit
is recycled, check_and_init_map_value() clears the only pointer to the
timer. Neither a later deletion nor rhtab_mem_dtor() can then cancel it,
and the callback can run with its key and value pointing into freed memory.
Do not reinitialize special fields on insertion. Fresh allocator units are
already zeroed. For recycled units, the special fields are ownership state
that must remain visible to the eventual destructor. copy_map_value()
already skips those fields, matching the non-preallocated hash-map path and
the lifecycle established by commit 275c30bcee66 ("bpf: Don't reinit map
value in prealloc_lru_pop").
[ kkd: Split out the fix and rewrote the commit log ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject untrusted allocated-object pointers
When the final RCU read-side critical section ends, a local kptr is demoted
to PTR_UNTRUSTED but retains MEM_ALLOC. The pointer may be NULL or may refer
to an object whose lifetime is no longer protected.
type_is_ptr_alloc_obj() nevertheless recognizes any PTR_TO_BTF_ID with
MEM_ALLOC as a live allocated object. In particular, a refcount-only local
kptr never carries NON_OWN_REF, so it still passes the
bpf_refcount_acquire() argument check after RCU protection ends. The kfunc
can then dereference NULL or stale memory.
Make type_is_ptr_alloc_obj() reject PTR_UNTRUSTED pointers. Since
type_is_non_owning_ref() is based on the same predicate, graph kfunc
arguments obey the same live-object requirement. Fault-protected reads of
the demoted pointer remain valid: writes are already rejected, and read
fixups use bpf_may_fault_on_deref() rather than this predicate.
[ kkd: Rewrote commit log ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/cfi: Fix FineIBT hash offset in cfi_get_func_hash()
The switch of the FineIBT preamble from "subl $hash, %r10d" to the
shorter "subl $hash, %eax" moved the hash immediate from offset 7 to
offset 5 of the preamble. fineibt_preamble_hash was updated to match,
but the open-coded offset in cfi_get_func_hash() was missed and it
still reads the hash at offset 7.
cfi_get_func_hash() is used by the BPF JIT to give a struct_ops
trampoline the CFI hash of the stub function it stands in for. With
FineIBT the trampoline now gets the upper half of the real hash
followed by the first two bytes of the next instruction, so the first
indirect call from the kernel into a struct_ops program,
tcp_init_congestion_control() calling ->init() of a BPF congestion
control for example, fails the FineIBT check and the kernel dies with
a CFI failure.
Move the FineIBT preamble template and its offset defines above
cfi_get_func_hash() and use fineibt_preamble_hash there, so every
reader of the preamble shares one definition of its layout. The
CFI_FINEIBT arm is only built with CONFIG_FINEIBT, the only
configuration in which cfi_mode can take that value.
cfi_get_func_arity() does not need the same treatment: the __bhi_args
call whose displacement it reads still ends at the function address. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/mm: Fix user-space data loss with MADV_FREE and THP
Some of users of Polars (a data analytics library) have lost production
data from this bug. They seem to have just the right combination of
huge pages, MADV_FREE and heavy reclaim pressure.
pmd_modify() masks the old value with (_HPAGE_CHG_MASK & ~_PAGE_DIRTY),
silently discarding the hardware dirty bit. The subsequent
pmd_mksaveddirty() call is supposed to transfer _PAGE_DIRTY into
_PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY when write-protecting, but the dirty bit was already
stripped from the value, so there is nothing left to transfer.
Contrast with pte_modify(), which keeps _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS in its mask,
and pud_modify(), which keeps _HPAGE_CHG_MASK untouched: pmd_modify()
is the odd one out. Any pmd_modify() on a writable, dirty PMD loses
the dirty state.
One visible consequence is data loss with MADV_FREE on PMD-mapped THP:
memset(buf, 0x5A, size); // PMD-mapped THP, PMD dirty
madvise(buf, size, MADV_FREE); // PMD cleaned but left writable,
// folio marked lazyfree
memset(buf, 0x5A, size); // hardware sets _PAGE_DIRTY again
mprotect(buf, size, PROT_READ); // pmd_modify() drops the dirty bit
mprotect(buf, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE);
// ... memory pressure ...
Reclaim (e.g. under memcg pressure) then finds the lazyfree folio with
no dirty bit set anywhere and frees it in
__discard_anon_folio_pmd_locked(), even though the data was rewritten
after MADV_FREE; subsequent reads fault in fresh zero pages. NUMA
hinting alone can trigger the same loss, as do_huge_pmd_numa_page()
restores the PMD through pmd_modify() as well.
PMD-mapped file THPs are affected too: mprotect()/NUMA hinting dropping
the dirty bit means rewritten data is never written back.
Fix it by keeping _PAGE_DIRTY in the preserved mask, exactly like
pte_modify() and pud_modify() do. The existing
pmd_mksaveddirty()/pmd_clear_saveddirty() pair then performs the
hardware-dirty <-> saved-dirty transition based on the write bit,
preserving the shadow-stack encoding rules. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/amd_node: Fix PCI device reference counting in amd_smn_init()
The local "root" pointer is a temporary variable used during the device
search. Therefore, refcount related to the search iterators should be cleaned
up after the search is complete.
Use the __free() cleanup macro to ensure the refcount is decremented when the
temporary pointer goes out of scope.
Additionally, increment the refcount when caching a root pointer. This ensures
the in-use refcount is separate from the temporary search refcounting.
Finally, drop the redundant "root = NULL" before the second search loop. The
pci_get_class() iterator always decrements the refcount of its "from"
argument, so the first loop can only fall through with "root" already NULL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
configfs: unhash the dentry before dropping the item in rmdir
configfs_get_config_item() treats a hashed dentry as proof that
sd->s_element is a live config_item. configfs_rmdir() breaks that:
simple_rmdir() leaves the dentry hashed, the last reference to the item is
dropped right after, and the dentry is only unhashed by d_delete() once
->rmdir() has returned. configfs_symlink() resolves its target holding no
lock on it, so get_target() can land in that window:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in config_item_get+0x26/0x90
get_target fs/configfs/symlink.c:128 [inline]
configfs_symlink+0x4ab/0x1030 fs/configfs/symlink.c:185
Unhash in configfs_remove_dir(), while the item is still guaranteed to be
there. A reference obtained just before that stays harmless, as
create_link() rechecks CONFIGFS_USET_DROPPING, already set by
configfs_detach_prep(). Both configfs_unregister_subsystem() paths
d_drop() after detaching, so this only makes rmdir match them. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: iscsi: Fix hang for aborted WRITE_PENDING commands
When a LUN_RESET aborts a WRITE command that is in the
TRANSPORT_WRITE_PENDING state, the target core sets CMD_T_ABORTED and
waits for the frontend to finish processing.
If the initiator subsequently sends the remaining dataout PDUs,
__iscsit_check_dataout_hdr() catches the payload, stops the dataout
timer if the sequence is final and finally dumps the data. However, the
iSCSI target doesn't trigger the completion process for these aborted
commands. Because of this, the abort path hangs indefinitely in
target_put_cmd_and_wait(), leading to a deadlocked target worker thread.
Fix this by explicitly calling target_complete_cmd() when the final
dataout PDU is received for an aborted WRITE command.
target_complete_cmd() detects the CMD_T_ABORTED flag and cleanly routes
the command into target_abort_work, allowing the abort completion to
successfully unblock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sunvdc: unmap LDC cookies when the descriptor send fails
__send_request() maps the request's pages into the LDC channel's map
table (ldc_map_sg()), fills in the descriptor and marks it
VIO_DESC_READY before ringing the doorbell via __vdc_tx_trigger().
When the trigger fails, the error path only prints a message: the
descriptor stays READY and the cookies are never unmapped. The
mapping is normally released in vdc_end_one() when the peer completes
the descriptor - but a descriptor whose doorbell was never sent will
never complete, and since dr->prod is not advanced on failure, the
reset path (vdc_requeue_inflight(), which walks [cons, prod)) never
visits it either. The map table entries are leaked permanently.
Since commit a11f6ca9aef9 ("sunvdc: Do not spin in an infinite loop
when vio_ldc_send() returns EAGAIN") trigger failures occur in
practice under load, so every resulting I/O error also leaks one
request's worth of entries from the fixed-size (8192 entries per
channel) map table. Because the allocator hands out contiguous
ranges, fragmentation makes large multi-segment requests fail first
as the table drains, until ldc_map_sg() fails permanently and the
disk is dead until reboot.
It also makes any retry-based recovery unusable: requeuing the
request on -EAGAIN remaps the pages on every attempt, overwriting
desc->cookies and orphaning the previous mapping, so the table
drains at the retry rate. This is the memory exhaustion observed
when the requeue approach was first tested in October 2025.
Roll back on failure: unmap the cookies, mark the descriptor FREE
again and clear the request entry. If the trigger failed with
-ENOTCONN, __vdc_tx_trigger() has already reset the port, which
tears down and reallocates both the dring and the LDC channel
including its map table - nothing to roll back, and the stale
descriptor must not be touched. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: restore the XDP program pointer when pre-allocation fails
mana_xdp_set() publishes the new program into apc->bpf_prog before it
allocates anything, because mana_pre_alloc_rxbufs() sizes the buffers
from it via mana_get_rxbuf_cfg(). When that allocation fails the
function returns the error directly, skipping the err_dealloc_rxbuffs
label which is the only place that restores the previous pointer.
The attach is reported as failed, so the BPF core drops the reference it
held for the caller and the program can be freed, while apc->bpf_prog
still points at it. The next consumer of mana_xdp_get() - typically
mana_chn_setxdp() from mana_alloc_queues() on the following ifup, or
after a TX timeout reset - then calls bpf_prog_add() on freed memory.
This is reachable from an ordinary "ip link set dev ethX xdp obj ..."
whenever the per-queue RX buffer pre-allocation cannot be satisfied.
Restore the previous program on that error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_api: Don't replay RTM_GETCHAIN in tc_ctl_chain().
If a netlink socket sends RTM_GETCHAIN requests repeatedly
without recv()ing the responses, tc_ctl_chain() hogs CPU and
triggers Hung Task splat. [0]
As caught in the stack trace, netlink_attachskb() could confuse
tc_ctl_chain() by returning -EAGAIN when the userspace netlink
socket's receive buffer is full.
The replay: label exists since commit 32a4f5ecd738 ("net: sched:
introduce chain object to uapi") but was not used initially.
Since commit 9f407f1768d3 ("net: sched: introduce chain templates"),
the label is needed for RTM_NEWCHAIN because tcf_proto_lookup_ops()
may release RTNL to call request_module().
However, the replay logic is unnecessary for RTM_GETCHAIN.
Let's apply the replay logic only for RTM_NEWCHAIN.
[0]:
INFO: task repro:1018 is blocked on a mutex likely owned by task repro:1022.
task:repro state:R running task stack:14096 pid:1022 tgid:1014 ppid:961 task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00080000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? clockevents_program_event (kernel/time/clockevents.c:372)
? pskb_expand_head (net/core/skbuff.c:615)
? skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1122)
? netlink_attachskb (./include/linux/skbuff.h:1323 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:1332 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1232)
? __netlink_lookup (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:882 ./include/linux/rhashtable.h:711 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:499)
? tc_chain_notify (net/sched/cls_api.c:3045)
? tc_chain_notify (./include/linux/skbuff.h:1384 net/sched/cls_api.c:3041)
? netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335)
? rtnl_unicast (./include/net/netlink.h:1198 net/core/rtnetlink.c:985)
? tc_ctl_chain (net/sched/cls_api.c:3242)
? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:7146)
? netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1354)
? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:7177)
? netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2556)
? netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319)
? netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1900)
? __sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:800)
? __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2281)
? __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2288 net/socket.c:2284 net/socket.c:2284)
? do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84)
? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_route: free emptied bucket on filter move
route4_change can move an existing filter to a different top-level
bucket: route4_set_parms recomputes the handle from TCA_ROUTE4_TO/
FROM/IIF, and the handle-mismatch check is gated on the 'new' flag, so
for an existing filter the new handle may differ from the old one and
land in a different bucket. When this happens, the filter is unlinked
from the old bucket, but the bucket itself is never freed once it goes
empty. The stale empty bucket remains in head->table[], causing
route4_delete to report *last=false even after the last live filter is
gone. That pins the empty tcf_proto and causes a leak.
Fix this by refcounting the filters linked to a bucket and freeing the
bucket when the count drops to zero. The existing scan in route4_delete
goes away with it.
The count is updated at all sites that link or unlink a filter during add,
change and delete, and the bucket is dropped from head->table[] as soon as
it reaches zero.
Conditions to recreate the bug:
CONFIG_NET_CLS_ROUTE4=y, CONFIG_NET_SCH_INGRESS=y, CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT=y.
tc qdisc replace dev lo clsact
tc filter add dev lo ingress protocol ip pref 100 route from 1 to 1
tc filter change dev lo ingress protocol ip pref 100 handle 0x10001 \
route from 1 to 2
tc filter del dev lo ingress protocol ip pref 100 handle 0x10002 \
route from 1 to 2
tc filter show dev lo ingress | grep -c 'pref 100 route chain 0 ' |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: initialize ptp_lock at probe time
priv->ptp_lock is only initialized in stmmac_ptp_register(), which runs
during __stmmac_open(). However, the lock is also used while the
interface is down and has never been opened: tc_taprio_configure()
invokes the PTP gettime64() callback to compute the EST base time when
offloading a TAPRIO schedule, and stmmac_get_time() takes
priv->ptp_lock. Using an uninitialized rwlock is undefined behaviour.
Move the rwlock_init() to __stmmac_dvr_probe(), together with the other
private locks, so that ptp_lock is always valid regardless of the
interface state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ppp_synctty: ensure a writeable skb header
ppp_sync_txmunge() checks headroom before prepending the address and
control bytes, but does not ensure that the skb header is writable.
A received skb can reach this function through PPP channel bridging
without passing through ppp_start_xmit(), which calls skb_cow_head().
For example, a PPPoE frame may share its buffer with a clone queued to
an AF_PACKET socket. If it is bridged to a synchronous tty channel, the
address/control bytes can overwrite data still visible to that socket.
Use skb_cow_head() to ensure both sufficient headroom and a writable
header. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-pf: reset HTB scheduler topology before freeing queues
HTB offload programs NIX_AF_TLxX_TOPOLOGY on QoS-allocated scheduler
queues via otx2_qos_txschq_set_parent_topology(), but teardown freed
those queues without clearing TOPOLOGY. The AF only restores PARENT and
SCHEDULE on free, so PRIO_ANCHOR/RR_PRIO settings can survive in the
shared scheduler pool and affect later allocations.
Add otx2_qos_reset_schq_topology() and otx2_qos_free_hw_schq() to zero
TL4 through TL2 TOPOLOGY before each schq is returned to the AF during
hierarchy teardown and cfg rollback. Skip the aggregation level (TL1):
it is a per-tx-link queue shared by the PF, default Tx hierarchy and VFs,
and is not freed back to the AF by nix_txschq_free_one(). |
