| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2/dlm: serialize migration MLE cleanup on failure
A migration MLE has a base reference for the mastering answer and an
in-use reference held by dlm_migrate_lockres(). The finishing assertion
consumes the base reference, but migration failure drops it again
without checking whether the assertion already consumed it.
The target queues its migration worker before it acknowledges the
ALL_DONE packet, so its finishing assertion can be handled while the
sender still waits for the status. If the connection fails before the
status arrives, dlm_send_one_lockres() returns an error for a migration
that the target has already completed:
Old-master sender Finishing assertion
----------------- -------------------
publish MLE; take in-use reference
send ALL_DONE; wait for status
take lookup reference
unlink MLE
put lookup and base references
send returns a connection error
put base reference again; free MLE
put in-use reference; access freed MLE
dlm_assert_master_handler() holds dlm->spinlock from the MLE lookup to
the final puts, and it takes dlm->master_lock around the unlink and the
puts. Decide under the same locks: if the MLE is already unhashed, the
assertion consumed the base reference, so drop only the sender's in-use
reference. Otherwise unlink it before consuming the base reference so a
later assertion no longer finds it.
An assertion that got there first has also made the target the owner
and cleared DLM_LOCK_RES_MIGRATING. Treating the attempt as failed at
that point would leave the lockres owned by the target while this node
still holds the other nodes' locks and refmap bits, so it could neither
be purged nor migrated again. Finish our side as a completed migration
does instead: drop those locks under res->spinlock if the target still
owns the lockres, and recalculate its usage.
Use the same cleanup for the pre-send failure, the send failure and the
target-death failure paths. The sender's in-use reference keeps the MLE
alive until its final put outside the nested locks. Successful
migration retains its existing in-use-only put.
A target that has died cannot assert after the sender has seen its
death. The o2net node-down callback runs before the DLM one; it
disconnects the node and flushes the workqueue that runs the message
handlers, so an assertion already received has been handled by the time
the DLM removes the node from the domain map. A node that leaves the
domain cleanly sends its exit message only after its assertions have
been answered.
Two windows of the hand-over itself are left as they are: the handler
switches the owner and the sender drops the other nodes' locks moments
later, and an assertion from a live target that arrives after the
sender has given up still meets the owner check in the handler. Waiting
for the target before giving up would only stretch the first window
into the time in which recovery of the target can observe it.
KASAN report, only the relevant frames are kept:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dlm_put_mle_inuse+0xce/0xe0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881190e3c20 by task umount/593
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dlm_put_mle_inuse+0xce/0xe0
dlm_migrate_lockres+0x16af/0x20d0
dlm_empty_lockres+0x60a/0xbd0
dlm_unregister_domain+0x53b/0x11d0
o2cb_cluster_disconnect+0xa5/0x110
ocfs2_cluster_disconnect+0x73/0xc0
ocfs2_dlm_shutdown+0x311/0x440
ocfs2_dismount_volume+0x696/0x940
generic_shutdown_super+0x15f/0x490
kill_block_super+0x40/0xa0
deactivate_locked_super+0xae/0x120
deactivate_super+0xa2/0xc0
cleanup_mnt+0x217/0x450
task_work_run+0x144/0x230
</TASK>
Allocated by task 593:
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x20b/0x5c0
dlm_migrate_lockres+0x20e/0x20d0
dlm_empty_lockres+0x60a/0xbd0
dlm_unregister_domain+0x53b/0x11d0
o2cb_cluster_disconnect+0xa5/
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: find the xattr entry again after defragmenting a bucket
ocfs2_xattr_set_entry_bucket() hands loc.xl_entry to ocfs2_xa_set() twice:
once for the bucket as it stands, and, if that reports -ENOSPC, once more
after ocfs2_defrag_xattr_bucket() has packed the name/value pairs down.
Defragmenting ends by sorting the entry array on xe_name_hash. Buckets
are kept sorted, so the sort only permutes entries that share a hash, but
lib/sort.c is an unstable heapsort and it does permute them. loc.xl_entry
is an address inside xh_entries[], so afterwards it denotes whichever
entry landed in that slot rather than the one the search found.
The second ocfs2_xa_set() then works on the wrong entry. Nothing on that
path compares the entry's name with xi->xi_name, so what happens depends
on how the two entries compare in size: ocfs2_xa_reuse_entry() trips its
BUG_ON() when the padded name sizes differ, and otherwise the new value is
written into the neighbouring attribute's value slot while the attribute
being set is left untouched. setxattr() reports success either way.
Remember the entry's hash before defragmenting and look the entry up
again afterwards, the way ocfs2_xattr_bucket_find() does. An entry that
cannot be found again means the bucket no longer holds what the search
found, so fail with -EFSCORRUPTED rather than writing through the stale
pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/cma: accept memory of CMA areas reserved at a fixed address
CMA areas allocated from memblock have their memory accepted by
memblock_alloc_range_nid(), but areas reserved at a fixed address with
memblock_reserve() are not.
If a fixed CMA area is requested by the cma=<size>@<base> command line
parameter, it may be in regular RAM and on TDX and SEV-SNP guests it
must be accepted.
Accept the memory of fixed CMA areas as well, so that all CMA areas are
accepted regardless of how they were reserved. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/cma: accept memory of multi-range CMA areas
Patch series "mm/cma: accept memory of CMA areas reserved with
memblock_reserve()", v1.
Pages of allocated CMA areas are released to the buddy allocator with
__free_pages(), which does not check for unaccepted memory.
This usually works because memblock accepts the memory it allocates.
However, multi-range CMA areas, used by hugetlb_cma, and fixed CMA areas
requested with cma=<size>@<base> are reserved with memblock_reserve() and
their memory is never accepted.
On TDX and SEV-SNP guests the first access to such a page is fatal.
To ease the backporting, each case is addressed by a separate patch:
- patch 1 accepts the memory of multi-range CMA areas
- patch 2 does the same for the fixed CMA areas
The second patch won't apply cleanly to 6.6 and 6.12, but I believe the
stable team LLMs will take care of that :)
This patch (of 2):
On systems with unaccepted memory, memblock allocations accept the
allocated range, but when cma_declare_contiguous_multi() uses open coded
allocation of multiple ranges, it reserves them with memblock_reserve()
and they are never accepted.
These pages are released to the buddy allocator by cma_activate_area()
with __free_pages() that does not check for unaccepted memory, so the
first access to such a page in a TDX or SEV-SNP guest is fatal.
Accept the memory of each range when it is reserved. |
| Missing Authorization vulnerability in Omnisend Newsletters, Email Marketing, SMS and Popups by Omnisend omnisend allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Newsletters, Email Marketing, SMS and Popups by Omnisend: from n/a through 1.9.1. |
| The Simple Membership WP user Import plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 1.9.2 This is due to missing or incorrect nonce validation on the add function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to import arbitrary WordPress users into Simple Membership and modify their WordPress role via the plugin's membership-level-to-role mapping via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link. Successful exploitation additionally requires an action by an administrator — the attacker cannot trigger the vulnerability on their own. |
| The Seraphinite Accelerator plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'HTTP_USER_AGENT' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 2.31 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. Exploitation requires that an administrator has previously enabled the 'Enable logging' and 'HTTP trace' diagnostic options in the plugin's Advanced → Debug settings, both of which are disabled by default. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.8.0, an authenticated user with permission to edit and run playbooks could modify a child playbook callback handle associated with another playbook run, which could alter the callback behavior of that run.
The vulnerability exists because the Playbook API does not verify that callback-handle updates belong to the related parent and child playbook runs. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.8.0, an authenticated user with permission to view, edit, and run playbooks and access to at least one container label could retrieve a callback handle from a playbook run outside the container-label scope granted to that account.
The vulnerability is possible because Splunk SOAR does not verify that the requested callback handle belongs to the parent playbook run that launched the child playbook.
For more information see Manage roles and permissions in Splunk SOAR (On-premises) (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/administer-soar-on-premises/8.8.0/manage-your-splunk-soar-on-premises-users-and-accounts/manage-roles-and-permissions-in-splunk-soar-on-premises) and Data access automation API (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/python-playbook-api-reference/8.8.0/automation-api/data-access-automation-api) in the Splunk documentation. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.8.0, a user with permission to create containers on one label could use the Representational State Transfer (REST) API to create a container with a parent relationship to a container that the user cannot access. This could let the user alter incident lineage across authorization boundaries and identify existing restricted containers.
The vulnerability is possible because the REST API accepts a customer-supplied parent relationship when creating a container without authorizing access to the referenced container.
For more information see REST Containers (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/rest-api-reference/8.6.0/container-endpoints/rest-containers) and Manage roles and permissions in Splunk SOAR (On-premises) (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/administer-soar-on-premises/8.8.0/manage-your-splunk-soar-on-premises-users-and-accounts/manage-roles-and-permissions-in-splunk-soar-on-premises) in the Splunk documentation. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.8.0, an unauthenticated user could gain administrator privileges through a user account that receives an unintended role. A user that holds a role with permission to create or modify users and assign roles must assign the target account a role with a numeric name through the user-management Representational State Transfer (REST) API.
The vulnerability is possible because the API resolves a numeric role name as a role identifier instead of preserving the requested role name. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.8.0, an authenticated user that holds a role with the System Settings edit permission could execute arbitrary code on the host that runs Splunk SOAR.
The vulnerability is possible because the Representational State Transfer (REST) API accepts package references from untrusted sources and passes them to the dependency installer. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.8.0, a user with permission to create and view containers for a label could use the Representational State Transfer (REST) API to create a container that references a workbook phase in a case the user cannot view, disclosing the phase name and creating an inconsistent phase association.
The vulnerability exists because the Container REST API does not enforce the same case-scoped authorization when it accepts a workbook-phase reference during container creation. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.8.0, a user that holds a role with the Apps edit permission could execute arbitrary code as the user account that runs Splunk SOAR by installing a malicious app.
The vulnerability is possible because Splunk SOAR does not restrict app dependencies to validated binary packages before installing them. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.8.0, a user that holds a role with only the apps:edit permission could install a connector app that causes Splunk SOAR to write attacker-controlled files outside the app directory. This could let the user modify files used by Splunk SOAR and execute arbitrary code as the user account that runs Splunk SOAR.
The vulnerability is possible because Splunk SOAR constructs the dependency installation command from app-supplied metadata without preventing that metadata from changing its arguments.
For more information see Manage roles and permissions in Splunk SOAR (On-premises) (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/administer-soar-on-premises/8.8.0/manage-your-splunk-soar-on-premises-users-and-accounts/manage-roles-and-permissions-in-splunk-soar-on-premises) and Add and configure apps and assets to provide actions in Splunk SOAR (On-premises) (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/administer-soar-on-premises/8.6.0/manage-your-splunk-soar-on-premises-apps-and-assets/add-and-configure-apps-and-assets-to-provide-actions-in-splunk-soar-on-premises) in the Splunk documentation. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.8.0, a user that holds a role with the System Settings edit permission could cause Splunk SOAR to send the stored root credential for an external credential store to a host that the user controls. Depending on the configuration, the exposed credential could include an access token, application secret, account password, or client certificate.
The vulnerability is possible because Splunk SOAR reuses the stored credential when the user changes the external credential store endpoint without supplying replacement credentials. |
| In Splunk Enterprise versions below 10.4.5, 10.2.9, 10.0.12, and 9.4.17, a user who holds the "power" Splunk role could craft a shared Classic Dashboard that runs arbitrary Search Processing Language (SPL) commands for another authenticated user. Exploitation requires the dashboard viewer to open the shared dashboard. The injected commands could access data available to the dashboard viewer, modify data available to the dashboard viewer, and partially disrupt Splunk Enterprise.
For more information see Add sparklines to search results (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/search/search-manual/10.6/calculate-statistics/add-sparklines-to-search-results), Configure dashboard permissions (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/create-dashboards-and-reports/simple-xml-dashboards/10.6/manage-and-share-dashboards/configure-dashboard-permissions), and SPL safeguards for risky commands (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/administer/manage-users-and-security/10.6/best-practices-for-splunk-platform-security/spl-safeguards-for-risky-commands) in the Splunk documentation. |
| In Splunk Enterprise versions below 10.4.5, 10.2.9, 10.0.12, and 9.4.17, a user who holds the "power" Splunk role could create and share a dashboard that contains attacker-controlled Search Processing Language (SPL). The SPL could run using the permissions of the user who opens the dashboard. With this access, the user who created the dashboard could expose stored credentials and write data to an index.
The vulnerability is possible because Splunk Enterprise does not correctly escape field names in searches that use the rename command.
For more information see rename (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/spl-search-reference/10.4/search-commands/rename) and SPL safeguards for risky commands (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/administer/manage-users-and-security/10.4/best-practices-for-splunk-platform-security/spl-safeguards-for-risky-commands) in the Splunk documentation. |
| In Splunk Enterprise versions below 10.4.5, 10.2.9, 10.0.12, and 9.4.16, a user who does not hold the "admin" or "power" Splunk roles could use Data Model Acceleration to run malicious Search Processing Language (SPL) commands and perform actions through the Representational State Transfer (REST) API that the user cannot perform directly.
The vulnerability is possible because Splunk Enterprise does not neutralize user-provided data before it adds that data to a generated search.
For more information, see Accelerate data models (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/manage-knowledge-objects/knowledge-management-manual/10.2/use-data-summaries-to-accelerate-searches/accelerate-data-models), Define roles on the Splunk platform with capabilities (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/administer/manage-users-and-security/10.2/manage-splunk-platform-users-and-roles/define-roles-on-the-splunk-platform-with-capabilities), and About the search language (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/search/search-manual/10.6/search-overview/about-the-search-language). |
| In Splunk Enterprise versions below 10.4.5, 10.2.9, 10.0.12, and 9.4.17, a user who holds the "power" Splunk role could store malicious Search Processing Language (SPL) in a shared dashboard. The malicious SPL could run using the permissions of the user who opened the dashboard and could access or modify data available to that user and disrupt Splunk Enterprise availability.
The vulnerability is possible because Splunk Enterprise does not preserve quoted search argument boundaries when it processes a dashboard search.
The vulnerability requires the attacker to phish the affected user by tricking them into initiating a request within their browser. The attacker, a user who holds the "power" Splunk role, should not be able to exploit the vulnerability at will. |