| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-mq: fix potential deadlock while nr_requests grown
Allocate and free sched_tags while queue is freezed can deadlock[1],
this is a long term problem, hence allocate memory before freezing
queue and free memory after queue is unfreezed.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/0659ea8d-a463-47c8-9180-43c719e106eb@linux.ibm.com/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: b2c2: Fix use-after-free causing by irq_check_work in flexcop_pci_remove
The original code uses cancel_delayed_work() in flexcop_pci_remove(), which
does not guarantee that the delayed work item irq_check_work has fully
completed if it was already running. This leads to use-after-free scenarios
where flexcop_pci_remove() may free the flexcop_device while irq_check_work
is still active and attempts to dereference the device.
A typical race condition is illustrated below:
CPU 0 (remove) | CPU 1 (delayed work callback)
flexcop_pci_remove() | flexcop_pci_irq_check_work()
cancel_delayed_work() |
flexcop_device_kfree(fc_pci->fc_dev) |
| fc = fc_pci->fc_dev; // UAF
This is confirmed by a KASAN report:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880093aa8c8 by task bash/135
...
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70
print_report+0xcf/0x610
? __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0
? __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
__run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
? __pfx___run_timer_base.part.0+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_read_tsc+0x10/0x10
? ktime_get+0x60/0x140
? lapic_next_event+0x11/0x20
? clockevents_program_event+0x1d4/0x2a0
run_timer_softirq+0xd1/0x190
handle_softirqs+0x16a/0x550
irq_exit_rcu+0xaf/0xe0
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x80
</IRQ>
...
Allocated by task 1:
kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90
__kmalloc_noprof+0x1be/0x460
flexcop_device_kmalloc+0x54/0xe0
flexcop_pci_probe+0x1f/0x9d0
local_pci_probe+0xdc/0x190
pci_device_probe+0x2fe/0x470
really_probe+0x1ca/0x5c0
__driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310
driver_probe_device+0x44/0x120
__driver_attach+0xd2/0x310
bus_for_each_dev+0xed/0x170
bus_add_driver+0x208/0x500
driver_register+0x132/0x460
do_one_initcall+0x89/0x300
kernel_init_freeable+0x40d/0x720
kernel_init+0x1a/0x150
ret_from_fork+0x10c/0x1a0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Freed by task 135:
kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3a/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x3f/0x50
kfree+0x137/0x370
flexcop_device_kfree+0x32/0x50
pci_device_remove+0xa6/0x1d0
device_release_driver_internal+0xf8/0x210
pci_stop_bus_device+0x105/0x150
pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x15/0x30
remove_store+0xcc/0xe0
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x2c3/0x440
vfs_write+0x871/0xd70
ksys_write+0xee/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0xac/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
...
Replace cancel_delayed_work() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() to ensure
that the delayed work item is properly canceled and any executing delayed
work has finished before the device memory is deallocated.
This bug was initially identified through static analysis. To reproduce
and test it, I simulated the B2C2 FlexCop PCI device in QEMU and introduced
artificial delays within the flexcop_pci_irq_check_work() function to
increase the likelihood of triggering the bug. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rtc: amlogic-a4: fix double free caused by devm
The clock obtained via devm_clk_get_enabled() is automatically managed
by devres and will be disabled and freed on driver detach. Manually
calling clk_disable_unprepare() in error path and remove function
causes double free.
Remove the redundant clk_disable_unprepare() calls from the probe
error path and aml_rtc_remove(), allowing the devm framework to
automatically manage the clock lifecycle. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: atmel-quadspi: Free resources even if runtime resume failed in .remove()
An early error exit in atmel_qspi_remove() doesn't prevent the device
unbind. So this results in an spi controller with an unbound parent
and unmapped register space (because devm_ioremap_resource() is undone).
So using the remaining spi controller probably results in an oops.
Instead unregister the controller unconditionally and only skip hardware
access and clk disable.
Also add a warning about resume failing and return zero unconditionally.
The latter has the only effect to suppress a less helpful error message by
the spi core. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/guc: Synchronize Dead CT worker with unbind
Cancel and wait for any Dead CT worker to complete before continuing
with device unbinding. Else the worker will end up using resources freed
by the undind operation.
(cherry picked from commit 492671339114e376aaa38626d637a2751cdef263) |
| PureVPN client applications on Linux through September 2025 allow IPv6 traffic to leak outside the VPN tunnel upon network events such as Wi-Fi reconnect or system resume. In the CLI client, the VPN auto-reconnects and claims to be connected, but IPv6 traffic is no longer routed or blocked. In the GUI client, the IPv6 connection remains functional after disconnection until the user clicks Reconnect. In both cases, the real IPv6 address is exposed to external services, violating user privacy and defeating the advertised IPv6 leak protection. This affects CLI 2.0.1 and GUI 2.10.0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: prevent poison consumption when splitting THP
When performing memory error injection on a THP (Transparent Huge Page)
mapped to userspace on an x86 server, the kernel panics with the following
trace. The expected behavior is to terminate the affected process instead
of panicking the kernel, as the x86 Machine Check code can recover from an
in-userspace #MC.
mce: [Hardware Error]: CPU 0: Machine Check Exception: f Bank 3: bd80000000070134
mce: [Hardware Error]: RIP 10:<ffffffff8372f8bc> {memchr_inv+0x4c/0xf0}
mce: [Hardware Error]: TSC afff7bbff88a ADDR 1d301b000 MISC 80 PPIN 1e741e77539027db
mce: [Hardware Error]: PROCESSOR 0:d06d0 TIME 1758093249 SOCKET 0 APIC 0 microcode 80000320
mce: [Hardware Error]: Run the above through 'mcelog --ascii'
mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check: Data load in unrecoverable area of kernel
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal local machine check
The root cause of this panic is that handling a memory failure triggered
by an in-userspace #MC necessitates splitting the THP. The splitting
process employs a mechanism, implemented in
try_to_map_unused_to_zeropage(), which reads the pages in the THP to
identify zero-filled pages. However, reading the pages in the THP results
in a second in-kernel #MC, occurring before the initial memory_failure()
completes, ultimately leading to a kernel panic. See the kernel panic
call trace on the two #MCs.
First Machine Check occurs // [1]
memory_failure() // [2]
try_to_split_thp_page()
split_huge_page()
split_huge_page_to_list_to_order()
__folio_split() // [3]
remap_page()
remove_migration_ptes()
remove_migration_pte()
try_to_map_unused_to_zeropage() // [4]
memchr_inv() // [5]
Second Machine Check occurs // [6]
Kernel panic
[1] Triggered by accessing a hardware-poisoned THP in userspace, which is
typically recoverable by terminating the affected process.
[2] Call folio_set_has_hwpoisoned() before try_to_split_thp_page().
[3] Pass the RMP_USE_SHARED_ZEROPAGE remap flag to remap_page().
[4] Try to map the unused THP to zeropage.
[5] Re-access pages in the hw-poisoned THP in the kernel.
[6] Triggered in-kernel, leading to a panic kernel.
In Step[2], memory_failure() sets the poisoned flag on the page in the THP
by TestSetPageHWPoison() before calling try_to_split_thp_page().
As suggested by David Hildenbrand, fix this panic by not accessing to the
poisoned page in the THP during zeropage identification, while continuing
to scan unaffected pages in the THP for possible zeropage mapping. This
prevents a second in-kernel #MC that would cause kernel panic in Step[4].
Thanks to Andrew Zaborowski for his initial work on fixing this issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: relax BUG() to ocfs2_error() in __ocfs2_move_extent()
In '__ocfs2_move_extent()', relax 'BUG()' to 'ocfs2_error()' just
to avoid crashing the whole kernel due to a filesystem corruption. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/vmemmap/devdax: fix kernel crash when probing devdax devices
commit 4917f55b4ef9 ("mm/sparse-vmemmap: improve memory savings for
compound devmaps") added support for using optimized vmmemap for devdax
devices. But how vmemmap mappings are created are architecture specific.
For example, powerpc with hash translation doesn't have vmemmap mappings
in init_mm page table instead they are bolted table entries in the
hardware page table
vmemmap_populate_compound_pages() used by vmemmap optimization code is not
aware of these architecture-specific mapping. Hence allow architecture to
opt for this feature. I selected architectures supporting
HUGETLB_PAGE_OPTIMIZE_VMEMMAP option as also supporting this feature.
This patch fixes the below crash on ppc64.
BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xc00c000100400038
Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000001269d90
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
Modules linked in:
CPU: 7 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc5-150500.34-default+ #2 5c90a668b6bbd142599890245c2fb5de19d7d28a
Hardware name: IBM,9009-42G POWER9 (raw) 0x4e0202 0xf000005 of:IBM,FW950.40 (VL950_099) hv:phyp pSeries
NIP: c000000001269d90 LR: c0000000004c57d4 CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c000000003632c30 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.3.0-rc5-150500.34-default+)
MSR: 8000000000009033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24842228 XER: 00000000
CFAR: c0000000004c57d0 DAR: c00c000100400038 DSISR: 42000000 IRQMASK: 0
....
NIP [c000000001269d90] __init_single_page.isra.74+0x14/0x4c
LR [c0000000004c57d4] __init_zone_device_page+0x44/0xd0
Call Trace:
[c000000003632ed0] [c000000003632f60] 0xc000000003632f60 (unreliable)
[c000000003632f10] [c0000000004c5ca0] memmap_init_zone_device+0x170/0x250
[c000000003632fe0] [c0000000005575f8] memremap_pages+0x2c8/0x7f0
[c0000000036330c0] [c000000000557b5c] devm_memremap_pages+0x3c/0xa0
[c000000003633100] [c000000000d458a8] dev_dax_probe+0x108/0x3e0
[c0000000036331a0] [c000000000d41430] dax_bus_probe+0xb0/0x140
[c0000000036331d0] [c000000000cef27c] really_probe+0x19c/0x520
[c000000003633260] [c000000000cef6b4] __driver_probe_device+0xb4/0x230
[c0000000036332e0] [c000000000cef888] driver_probe_device+0x58/0x120
[c000000003633320] [c000000000cefa6c] __device_attach_driver+0x11c/0x1e0
[c0000000036333a0] [c000000000cebc58] bus_for_each_drv+0xa8/0x130
[c000000003633400] [c000000000ceefcc] __device_attach+0x15c/0x250
[c0000000036334a0] [c000000000ced458] bus_probe_device+0x108/0x110
[c0000000036334f0] [c000000000ce92dc] device_add+0x7fc/0xa10
[c0000000036335b0] [c000000000d447c8] devm_create_dev_dax+0x1d8/0x530
[c000000003633640] [c000000000d46b60] __dax_pmem_probe+0x200/0x270
[c0000000036337b0] [c000000000d46bf0] dax_pmem_probe+0x20/0x70
[c0000000036337d0] [c000000000d2279c] nvdimm_bus_probe+0xac/0x2b0
[c000000003633860] [c000000000cef27c] really_probe+0x19c/0x520
[c0000000036338f0] [c000000000cef6b4] __driver_probe_device+0xb4/0x230
[c000000003633970] [c000000000cef888] driver_probe_device+0x58/0x120
[c0000000036339b0] [c000000000cefd08] __driver_attach+0x1d8/0x240
[c000000003633a30] [c000000000cebb04] bus_for_each_dev+0xb4/0x130
[c000000003633a90] [c000000000cee564] driver_attach+0x34/0x50
[c000000003633ab0] [c000000000ced878] bus_add_driver+0x218/0x300
[c000000003633b40] [c000000000cf1144] driver_register+0xa4/0x1b0
[c000000003633bb0] [c000000000d21a0c] __nd_driver_register+0x5c/0x100
[c000000003633c10] [c00000000206a2e8] dax_pmem_init+0x34/0x48
[c000000003633c30] [c0000000000132d0] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x320
[c000000003633d00] [c0000000020051b0] kernel_init_freeable+0x360/0x400
[c000000003633de0] [c000000000013764] kernel_init+0x34/0x1d0
[c000000003633e50] [c00000000000de14] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwrng: virtio - Fix race on data_avail and actual data
The virtio rng device kicks off a new entropy request whenever the
data available reaches zero. When a new request occurs at the end
of a read operation, that is, when the result of that request is
only needed by the next reader, then there is a race between the
writing of the new data and the next reader.
This is because there is no synchronisation whatsoever between the
writer and the reader.
Fix this by writing data_avail with smp_store_release and reading
it with smp_load_acquire when we first enter read. The subsequent
reads are safe because they're either protected by the first load
acquire, or by the completion mechanism.
Also remove the redundant zeroing of data_idx in random_recv_done
(data_idx must already be zero at this point) and data_avail in
request_entropy (ditto). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: fs, fix UAF in flow counter release
Fix a kernel trace [1] caused by releasing an HWS action of a local flow
counter in mlx5_cmd_hws_delete_fte(), where the HWS action refcount and
mutex were not initialized and the counter struct could already be freed
when deleting the rule.
Fix it by adding the missing initializations and adding refcount for the
local flow counter struct.
[1] Kernel log:
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48
mlx5_fs_put_hws_action.part.0.cold+0x21/0x94 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_fc_put_hws_action+0x96/0xad [mlx5_core]
mlx5_fs_destroy_fs_actions+0x8b/0x152 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_cmd_hws_delete_fte+0x5a/0xa0 [mlx5_core]
del_hw_fte+0x1ce/0x260 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x12d/0x240 [mlx5_core]
? ttwu_queue_wakelist+0xf4/0x110
mlx5_ib_destroy_flow+0x103/0x1b0 [mlx5_ib]
uverbs_free_flow+0x20/0x50 [ib_uverbs]
destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x1b/0x50 [ib_uverbs]
uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x34/0x1a0 [ib_uverbs]
uobj_destroy+0x3c/0x80 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_run_method+0x23e/0x360 [ib_uverbs]
? uverbs_finalize_object+0x60/0x60 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x14f/0x2c0 [ib_uverbs]
? do_tty_write+0x1a9/0x270
? file_tty_write.constprop.0+0x98/0xc0
? new_sync_write+0xfc/0x190
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xd7/0x160 [ib_uverbs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x87/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x59/0x90 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
EDAC/i10nm: Skip DIMM enumeration on a disabled memory controller
When loading the i10nm_edac driver on some Intel Granite Rapids servers,
a call trace may appear as follows:
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/edac/skx_common.c:453:16
shift exponent -66 is negative
...
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1e3/0x390
skx_get_dimm_info.cold+0x47/0xd40 [skx_edac_common]
i10nm_get_dimm_config+0x23e/0x390 [i10nm_edac]
skx_register_mci+0x159/0x220 [skx_edac_common]
i10nm_init+0xcb0/0x1ff0 [i10nm_edac]
...
This occurs because some BIOS may disable a memory controller if there
aren't any memory DIMMs populated on this memory controller. The DIMMMTR
register of this disabled memory controller contains the invalid value
~0, resulting in the call trace above.
Fix this call trace by skipping DIMM enumeration on a disabled memory
controller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: udc: fix use-after-free in usb_gadget_state_work
A race condition during gadget teardown can lead to a use-after-free
in usb_gadget_state_work(), as reported by KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in sysfs_notify+0x2c/0xd0
Workqueue: events usb_gadget_state_work
The fundamental race occurs because a concurrent event (e.g., an
interrupt) can call usb_gadget_set_state() and schedule gadget->work
at any time during the cleanup process in usb_del_gadget().
Commit 399a45e5237c ("usb: gadget: core: flush gadget workqueue after
device removal") attempted to fix this by moving flush_work() to after
device_del(). However, this does not fully solve the race, as a new
work item can still be scheduled *after* flush_work() completes but
before the gadget's memory is freed, leading to the same use-after-free.
This patch fixes the race condition robustly by introducing a 'teardown'
flag and a 'state_lock' spinlock to the usb_gadget struct. The flag is
set during cleanup in usb_del_gadget() *before* calling flush_work() to
prevent any new work from being scheduled once cleanup has commenced.
The scheduling site, usb_gadget_set_state(), now checks this flag under
the lock before queueing the work, thus safely closing the race window. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Prevent access to vCPU events before init
Another day, another syzkaller bug. KVM erroneously allows userspace to
pend vCPU events for a vCPU that hasn't been initialized yet, leading to
KVM interpreting a bunch of uninitialized garbage for routing /
injecting the exception.
In one case the injection code and the hyp disagree on whether the vCPU
has a 32bit EL1 and put the vCPU into an illegal mode for AArch64,
tripping the BUG() in exception_target_el() during the next injection:
kernel BUG at arch/arm64/kvm/inject_fault.c:40!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 318 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4-00104-g10fd0285305d #6 PREEMPT
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 21402009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : exception_target_el+0x88/0x8c
lr : pend_serror_exception+0x18/0x13c
sp : ffff800082f03a10
x29: ffff800082f03a10 x28: ffff0000cb132280 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff0000c2a99c20 x24: 0000000000000000
x23: 0000000000008000 x22: 0000000000000002 x21: 0000000000000004
x20: 0000000000008000 x19: ffff0000c2a99c20 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 00000000200000c0
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000
x8 : ffff800082f03af8 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : ffff800080f621f0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 000000000040009b x1 : 0000000000000003 x0 : ffff0000c2a99c20
Call trace:
exception_target_el+0x88/0x8c (P)
kvm_inject_serror_esr+0x40/0x3b4
__kvm_arm_vcpu_set_events+0xf0/0x100
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x180/0x9d4
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x60c/0x9f4
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x104
invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
el0_svc+0x34/0xf0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
Code: f946bc01 b4fffe61 9101e020 17fffff2 (d4210000)
Reject the ioctls outright as no sane VMM would call these before
KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT anyway. Even if it did the exception would've been
thrown away by the eventual reset of the vCPU's state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: lpfc: Fix hard lockup when reading the rx_monitor from debugfs
During I/O and simultaneous cat of /sys/kernel/debug/lpfc/fnX/rx_monitor, a
hard lockup similar to the call trace below may occur.
The spin_lock_bh in lpfc_rx_monitor_report is not protecting from timer
interrupts as expected, so change the strength of the spin lock to _irq.
Kernel panic - not syncing: Hard LOCKUP
CPU: 3 PID: 110402 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded
exception RIP: native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+91
[IRQ stack]
native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffffb814e30b
_raw_spin_lock at ffffffffb89a667a
lpfc_rx_monitor_record at ffffffffc0a73a36 [lpfc]
lpfc_cmf_timer at ffffffffc0abbc67 [lpfc]
__hrtimer_run_queues at ffffffffb8184250
hrtimer_interrupt at ffffffffb8184ab0
smp_apic_timer_interrupt at ffffffffb8a026ba
apic_timer_interrupt at ffffffffb8a01c4f
[End of IRQ stack]
apic_timer_interrupt at ffffffffb8a01c4f
lpfc_rx_monitor_report at ffffffffc0a73c80 [lpfc]
lpfc_rx_monitor_read at ffffffffc0addde1 [lpfc]
full_proxy_read at ffffffffb83e7fc3
vfs_read at ffffffffb833fe71
ksys_read at ffffffffb83402af
do_syscall_64 at ffffffffb800430b
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffffb8a000ad |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: fix memory leak in bnxt_nvm_test()
Free the kzalloc'ed buffer before returning in the success path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kheaders: Use array declaration instead of char
Under CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE, memcpy() will check the size of destination
and source buffers. Defining kernel_headers_data as "char" would trip
this check. Since these addresses are treated as byte arrays, define
them as arrays (as done everywhere else).
This was seen with:
$ cat /sys/kernel/kheaders.tar.xz >> /dev/null
detected buffer overflow in memcpy
kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1027!
...
RIP: 0010:fortify_panic+0xf/0x20
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ikheaders_read+0x45/0x50 [kheaders]
kernfs_fop_read_iter+0x1a4/0x2f0
... |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
misc: fastrpc: fix possible map leak in fastrpc_put_args
copy_to_user() failure would cause an early return without cleaning up
the fdlist, which has been updated by the DSP. This could lead to map
leak. Fix this by redirecting to a cleanup path on failure, ensuring
that all mapped buffers are properly released before returning. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: dvb-usb: m920x: Fix a potential memory leak in m920x_i2c_xfer()
'read' is freed when it is known to be NULL, but not when a read error
occurs.
Revert the logic to avoid a small leak, should a m920x_read() call fail. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm/dpu: Disallow unallocated resources to be returned
In the event that the topology requests resources that have not been
created by the system (because they are typically not represented in
dpu_mdss_cfg ^1), the resource(s) in global_state (in this case DSC
blocks, until their allocation/assignment is being sanity-checked in
"drm/msm/dpu: Reject topologies for which no DSC blocks are available")
remain NULL but will still be returned out of
dpu_rm_get_assigned_resources, where the caller expects to get an array
containing num_blks valid pointers (but instead gets these NULLs).
To prevent this from happening, where null-pointer dereferences
typically result in a hard-to-debug platform lockup, num_blks shouldn't
increase past NULL blocks and will print an error and break instead.
After all, max_blks represents the static size of the maximum number of
blocks whereas the actual amount varies per platform.
^1: which can happen after a git rebase ended up moving additions to
_dpu_cfg to a different struct which has the same patch context.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/517636/ |
