| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A malicious actor with access to the network could exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability found in UniFi Talk Application to execute a Denial of Service (DoS) attack and bypass authentication in certain UniFi Talk API endpoints. |
| A malicious actor with access to the network and low privileges could exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in UniFi Protect Application to escalate privileges on the host device. |
| Coolify is an open-source and self-hostable tool for managing servers, applications, and databases. Prior to 4.0.0-beta.474, S3 storage endpoint validation only checks URL format and testConnection() sends a server-side request to the configured endpoint, allowing an authenticated user with storage management permissions to make Coolify request internal or metadata-service URLs. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.0-beta.474. |
| Coolify is an open-source and self-hostable tool for managing servers, applications, and databases. Prior to 4.0.0-beta.471, the GithubApp api_url field is used as the base URL for server-side HTTP requests without allowlisting or private IP blocking, allowing an authenticated user to configure a GitHub App source that causes Coolify to request internal services or cloud metadata endpoints. This issue is reported as fixed in version 4.0.0-beta.471. |
| NVIDIA Megatron Bridge for Linux contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause server-side request forgery. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to information disclosure. |
| PIA's OIDC issuer allowlist for Jenkins tokens uses a bare string-prefix check (issuer.startswith(' https://ci.eclipse.org ') in is_issuer_known, pia/models.py:139) instead of validating the issuer as a properly host-bounded URL. An attacker can craft an issuer such as https://ci.eclipse.org@evil.host (userinfo trick) or https://ci.eclipse.org.evil.host (suffix trick) that satisfies the prefix check while pointing the OIDC discovery and JWKS fetches at a server the attacker controls. An unauthenticated caller of POST /v1/upload/sbom can use this to force PIA to make outbound HTTP(S) requests to an arbitrary attacker-chosen host, and to have oidc.verify_token accept a JWT signed with the attacker's own key. |
| Crawl4AI is an open-source LLM-friendly web crawler and scraper. Prior to 0.9.0, the Docker API server applied its SSRF destination check on the non-streaming /crawl path but not on the streaming path. handle_stream_crawl_request passed seed URLs straight to the crawler with no destination validation, allowing a remote unauthenticated client to call POST /crawl/stream or POST /crawl with crawler_config.stream=true with a URL pointing at an internal, private, or link-local address; the server fetched it and streamed the response body back. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.0. |
| liboauth2 is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in oauth2_jose_jwks_aws_alb_resolve() function. The AWS ALB verifier reads both signer and kid from the unverified JWT
header. If signer matches the configured ARN, kid is appended to
alb_base_url without URL encoding or path sanitization, and the HTTP GET
is issued before signature verification. This allows an attacker to force
the server to send a GET request to an attacker-chosen internal path.
This issue was fixed in version 2.3.0 |
| Server-side request forgery (ssrf) in Microsoft Entra Provisioning Service (SyncFabric) allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| Gitea versions up to and including 1.26.2 have incomplete SSRF protection in webhook and migration allow-list filtering. |
| SSRF via HTTP Redirect in Repository Migration |
| Improper Input Validation, Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel in Vertx Websocket component.
The camel-vertx-websocket consumer mapped inbound WebSocket query and path parameters into the Camel Exchange header map without applying any HeaderFilterStrategy (VertxWebsocketConsumer.populateExchangeHeaders()). Because nothing blocked the Camel header namespace, a client connecting to the WebSocket endpoint could set Camel-internal control headers - including CamelHttpUri (Exchange.HTTP_URI) - simply by supplying them as query parameters. In a route where the WebSocket consumer feeds a downstream HTTP producer, the injected CamelHttpUri redirects the server-side HTTP request to an attacker-chosen destination (server-side request forgery - for example to an internal service or a cloud metadata endpoint). In addition, the HTTP producer resolves Camel property placeholders on the resulting (attacker-controlled) URI, so placeholders embedded in the injected value - such as an environment-variable reference, an application property, or a vault reference - are resolved to their real values and sent to the attacker, disclosing environment variables, application properties and vault secrets. When the WebSocket endpoint is exposed without authentication, this is reachable by an unauthenticated remote attacker.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix makes the affected consumers apply a HeaderFilterStrategy that filters the Camel header namespace case-insensitively on inbound mapping, so externally-supplied Camel* / camel* headers are no longer copied into the Exchange. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the Camel control headers from the inbound message before they reach any downstream producer (for example removeHeaders('Camel*') and removeHeaders('camel*') at the start of the route), require authentication on the WebSocket endpoint, and avoid bridging an untrusted consumer directly into an HTTP producer whose target URI can be driven from message headers. |
| Improper Input Validation, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel DNS component.
The camel-dns producers read DNS operation parameters - the resolver to query, the name or domain to look up, the record type and class, and the search term - from Exchange message headers whose constant values (DnsConstants.DNS_SERVER, DNS_NAME, DNS_DOMAIN, DNS_TYPE, DNS_CLASS, TERM) were the plain strings dns.server, dns.name, dns.domain, dns.type, dns.class and term. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a dns: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the dns.server header to make the dig producer build a SimpleResolver pointing at an attacker-controlled DNS server - a server-side request forgery via DNS, through which the attacker observes the queried name and can return poisoned responses - and set the dns.name / dns.domain headers to resolve arbitrary internal hostnames, disclosing whether they exist (internal network reconnaissance). No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that drive DNS operations via the raw header names must use CamelDnsServer / CamelDnsName / CamelDnsDomain / CamelDnsType / CamelDnsClass / CamelDnsTerm instead of the dns.* / term names. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the dns.* and term headers from any untrusted ingress before the dns: producer, and set the DNS server and lookup parameters from a trusted source in the route. |
| Improper Input Validation, Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel in Atmosphere Websocket Component.
The camel-atmosphere-websocket consumer mapped inbound WebSocket query parameters into the Camel Exchange header map without applying any HeaderFilterStrategy (WebsocketConsumer.sendEventNotification() iterates the query-string map collected in WebsocketConsumer.service() and copies each entry into the Exchange). Because nothing blocked the Camel header namespace, a client connecting to the WebSocket endpoint could set Camel-internal control headers - including CamelHttpUri (Exchange.HTTP_URI) - simply by supplying them as query parameters. In a route where the WebSocket consumer feeds a downstream HTTP producer, the injected CamelHttpUri redirects the server-side HTTP request to an attacker-chosen destination (server-side request forgery - for example to an internal service or a cloud metadata endpoint). In addition, the HTTP producer resolves Camel property placeholders on the resulting (attacker-controlled) URI, so placeholders embedded in the injected value - such as an environment-variable reference, an application property, or a vault reference - are resolved to their real values and sent to the attacker, disclosing environment variables, application properties and vault secrets. When the WebSocket endpoint is exposed without authentication, this is reachable by an unauthenticated remote attacker.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix makes the consumer apply the HeaderFilterStrategy it already inherits from the HTTP/servlet stack, filtering the Camel header namespace case-insensitively on inbound mapping, so externally-supplied Camel* / camel* headers are no longer copied into the Exchange. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the Camel control headers from the inbound message before they reach any downstream producer (for example removeHeaders('Camel*') and removeHeaders('camel*') at the start of the route), require authentication on the WebSocket endpoint, and avoid bridging an untrusted consumer directly into an HTTP producer whose target URI can be driven from message headers. |
| Improper Input Validation, Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel in Iggy component.
The camel-iggy consumer mapped the user-headers of inbound Iggy messages into the Camel Exchange header map without applying any HeaderFilterStrategy (IggyFetchRecords copied the message user-headers straight into the Exchange). Because nothing blocked the Camel header namespace, an actor able to publish to the consumed Iggy stream/topic could set Camel-internal control headers - including CamelHttpUri (Exchange.HTTP_URI) - simply by supplying them as message user-headers. In a route where the Iggy consumer feeds a downstream HTTP producer, the injected CamelHttpUri redirects the server-side HTTP request to an attacker-chosen destination (server-side request forgery - for example to an internal service or a cloud metadata endpoint). In addition, the HTTP producer resolves Camel property placeholders on the resulting (attacker-controlled) URI, so placeholders embedded in the injected value - such as an environment-variable reference, an application property, or a vault reference - are resolved to their real values and sent to the attacker, disclosing environment variables, application properties and vault secrets.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.17.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix adds a dedicated IggyHeaderFilterStrategy (and a headerFilterStrategy endpoint option) that filters the Camel header namespace case-insensitively on inbound mapping, so externally-supplied Camel* / camel* headers are no longer copied into the Exchange. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the Camel control headers from the inbound message before they reach any downstream producer (for example removeHeaders('Camel*') and removeHeaders('camel*') at the start of the route), restrict who can publish to the consumed Iggy stream/topic, and avoid bridging an untrusted consumer directly into an HTTP producer whose target URI can be driven from message headers. |
| SharePoint for ownCloud is an application for using SharePoint with the file storage, synchronization, and sharing application ownCloud Classic. In SharePoint for ownCloud prior to version 0.4.1, which corresponds to ownCloud 10 prior to 10.15.3, an attacker with administrative privileges can use a SSRF vulnerability in the SharePoint app to execute arbitrary code on the system. Upgrade ownCloud 10 to version 10.15.3 or later to receive SharePoint for ownCloud 0.4.1, the fixed version. |
| Anti-Virus for ownCloud is an anti-virus application for file storage, synchronization, and sharing application ownCloud. Versions of Anti-Virus for ownCloud before 1.2.3 are vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This corresponds to versions of ownCloud 10 prior to 10.15.3. Upgrade ownCloud 10 to version 10.15.3 or later or upgrade Anti-Virus for ownCloud 10 to version 1.2.3 or later to receive a fix. |
| Hugo is a static site generator. From v0.162.0 through v0.163.0, the default security.http.urls policy denies requests to loopback, internal, and cloud-metadata IPv4 literals, but the deny rule only matched dotted-decimal notation, so alternate IPv4 encodings of the same addresses, including integer, hex, or octal, passed the policy. When a template passes an untrusted or data-derived URL to resources.GetRemote and the host platform uses the cgo system resolver, these encodings resolve to the blocked address, allowing build-time server-side requests to loopback and internal services, including the cloud-metadata endpoint in hosted or CI builds; the same check is reused on redirects, so the gap also applies to each redirect hop. This issue is fixed in v0.163.1. |
| Hugo is a static site generator. From 0.91.0 until 0.162.0, resources.GetRemote enforces security.http.urls on the URL it is called with, but it did not re-validate intermediate URLs on HTTP 3xx redirects. An allowed server (or an attacker controlling its DNS or response) could therefore redirect the request to a host that the policy was meant to forbid and Hugo would fetch from the redirected target. The same bypass also lifted any host-shape restriction the operator had put in place. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.162.0. |
| Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection'), Improper Input Validation, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel Solr component.
The camel-solr producer copies Exchange message headers whose names begin with the SolrParam. prefix into the parameters of the Solr request, and headers whose names begin with the SolrField. prefix into the fields of the indexed Solr document. The prefix constants (SolrConstants.HEADER_PARAM_PREFIX / HEADER_FIELD_PREFIX) were the plain strings SolrParam. / SolrField.. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a solr: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set SolrParam.* headers to inject arbitrary Solr request parameters - including shards or stream.url, which cause the Solr server to issue server-side requests to an attacker-chosen URL (server-side request forgery, for example to an internal service or a cloud metadata endpoint), or qt to reach administrative request handlers - and set SolrField.* headers to inject arbitrary fields into indexed documents. No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that set Solr parameters or fields via the raw header prefixes must use CamelSolrParam. / CamelSolrField. instead of SolrParam. / SolrField.. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the SolrParam.* and SolrField.* headers from any untrusted ingress before the solr: producer, and set the required Solr parameters and fields from a trusted source in the route. |
