| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A flaw was found in p11-kit. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by calling the C_DeriveKey function on a remote token with specific IBM kyber or IBM btc derive mechanism parameters set to NULL. This could lead to the RPC-client attempting to return an uninitialized value, potentially resulting in a NULL dereference or undefined behavior. This issue may cause an application level denial of service or other unpredictable system states. |
| FreeType commit 22a0cccb4d9d002f33c1ba7a4b36812c7d4f46b5 was discovered to contain a segmentation violation via the function FT_Request_Size. |
| FreeType commit 53dfdcd8198d2b3201a23c4bad9190519ba918db was discovered to contain a segmentation violation via the function FNT_Size_Request. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/display: fix oops in suspend/shutdown without display
The xe driver keeps track of whether to probe display, and whether
display hardware is there, using xe->info.probe_display. It gets set to
false if there's no display after intel_display_device_probe(). However,
the display may also be disabled via fuses, detected at a later time in
intel_display_device_info_runtime_init().
In this case, the xe driver does for_each_intel_crtc() on uninitialized
mode config in xe_display_flush_cleanup_work(), leading to a NULL
pointer dereference, and generally calls display code with display info
cleared.
Check for intel_display_device_present() after
intel_display_device_info_runtime_init(), and reset
xe->info.probe_display as necessary. Also do unset_display_features()
for completeness, although display runtime init has already done
that. This will need to be unified across all cases later.
Move intel_display_device_info_runtime_init() call slightly earlier,
similar to i915, to avoid a bunch of unnecessary setup for no display
cases.
Note #1: The xe driver has no business doing low level display plumbing
like for_each_intel_crtc() to begin with. It all needs to happen in
display code.
Note #2: The actual bug is present already in commit 44e694958b95
("drm/xe/display: Implement display support"), but the oops was likely
introduced later at commit ddf6492e0e50 ("drm/xe/display: Make display
suspend/resume work on discrete").
(cherry picked from commit 7c3eb9f47533220888a67266448185fd0775d4da) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/virtio: Fix driver removal with disabled KMS
DRM atomic and modesetting aren't initialized if virtio-gpu driver built
with disabled KMS, leading to access of uninitialized data on driver
removal/unbinding and crashing kernel. Fix it by skipping shutting down
atomic core with unavailable KMS. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: PCM: Fix wait queue list corruption in snd_pcm_drain() on linked streams
snd_pcm_drain() uses init_waitqueue_entry which does not clear
entry.prev/next, and add_wait_queue with a conditional
remove_wait_queue that is skipped when to_check is no longer
in the group after concurrent UNLINK. The orphaned wait entry
remains on the unlinked substream sleep queue. On the next
drain iteration, add_wait_queue adds the entry to a new queue
while still linked on the old one, corrupting both lists. A
subsequent wake_up dereferences NULL at the func pointer
(mapped from the spinlock at offset 0 of the misinterpreted
wait_queue_head_t), causing a kernel panic.
Replace init_waitqueue_entry/add_wait_queue/conditional
remove_wait_queue with init_wait_entry/prepare_to_wait/
finish_wait. init_wait_entry clears prev/next via
INIT_LIST_HEAD on each iteration and sets
autoremove_wake_function which auto-removes the entry on
wake-up. finish_wait safely handles both the already-removed
and still-queued cases. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: tp_meter: avoid use of uninit sender vars
batadv_tp_recv_ack() and batadv_tp_stop() are only valid for tp_vars in the
BATADV_TP_SENDER role. When called with a BATADV_TP_RECEIVER role, it
proceeds to read sender-only members that were never initialized, leading
to undefined behavior.
This can be triggered when a node that is currently acting as a receiver in
an ongoing tp_meter session receives a malicious ACK packet.
Guard against this by checking tp_vars->role immediately after the
lookup and bailing out if it is not BATADV_TP_SENDER, before any of
those members are accessed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: test_run: Fix the null pointer dereference issue in bpf_lwt_xmit_push_encap
The bpf_lwt_xmit_push_encap helper needs to access skb_dst(skb)->dev to
calculate the needed headroom:
err = skb_cow_head(skb,
len + LL_RESERVED_SPACE(skb_dst(skb)->dev));
But skb->_skb_refdst may not be initialized when the skb is set up by
bpf_prog_test_run_skb function. Executing bpf_lwt_push_ip_encap function
in this scenario will trigger null pointer dereference, causing a kernel
crash as Yinhao reported:
[ 105.186365] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[ 105.186382] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 105.186388] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 105.186393] PGD 121d3d067 P4D 121d3d067 PUD 106c83067 PMD 0
[ 105.186404] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 105.186412] CPU: 3 PID: 3250 Comm: poc Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.19.0-rc5 #1
[ 105.186423] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 105.186427] RIP: 0010:bpf_lwt_push_ip_encap+0x1eb/0x520
[ 105.186443] Code: 0f 84 de 01 00 00 0f b7 4a 04 66 85 c9 0f 85 47 01 00 00 31 c0 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e c3 cc cc cc cc 48 8b 73 58 48 83 e6 fe <48> 8b 36 0f b7 be ec 00 00 00 0f b7 b6 e6 00 00 00 01 fe 83 e6 f0
[ 105.186449] RSP: 0018:ffffbb0e0387bc50 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 105.186455] RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: ffff94c74e036500 RCX: ffff94c74874da00
[ 105.186460] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff94c74e036500
[ 105.186463] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 105.186467] R10: ffffbb0e0387bd50 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffbb0e0387bc98
[ 105.186471] R13: 0000000000000014 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000002
[ 105.186484] FS: 00007f166aa4d680(0000) GS:ffff94c8b7780000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 105.186490] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 105.186494] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000015eade001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[ 105.186499] PKRU: 55555554
[ 105.186502] Call Trace:
[ 105.186507] <TASK>
[ 105.186513] bpf_lwt_xmit_push_encap+0x2b/0x40
[ 105.186522] bpf_prog_a75eaad51e517912+0x41/0x49
[ 105.186536] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x18/0x30
[ 105.186547] ? ktime_get+0x3c/0xa0
[ 105.186554] bpf_test_run+0x195/0x320
[ 105.186563] ? bpf_test_run+0x10f/0x320
[ 105.186579] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x2f5/0x4f0
[ 105.186590] __sys_bpf+0x69c/0xa40
[ 105.186603] __x64_sys_bpf+0x1e/0x30
[ 105.186611] do_syscall_64+0x59/0x110
[ 105.186620] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0xe0
[ 105.186649] RIP: 0033:0x7f166a97455d
Temporarily add the setting of skb->_skb_refdst before bpf_test_run to resolve the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_fib: fix stale stack leak via the OIFNAME register
For NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIFNAME the destination register is declared with
len = IFNAMSIZ (four 32-bit registers), but on the lookup-fail,
RTN_LOCAL and oif-mismatch paths nft_fib{4,6}_eval() only writes one
register via "*dest = 0". The remaining three registers are left as
whatever was on the stack in nft_do_chain()'s struct nft_regs, and a
downstream expression that loads the register span can leak that
uninitialised kernel stack to userspace.
The NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT existence check has the same shape: it is only
meaningful for NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF, yet it was accepted for any result type
while the eval stores a single byte via nft_reg_store8(), leaving the rest
of the declared span stale.
Fix both:
- replace the bare "*dest = 0" in the eval with nft_fib_store_result(),
which strscpy_pad()s the whole IFNAMSIZ for OIFNAME (and is already
used on the other early-return path), and
- restrict NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT to NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF and declare its
destination as a single u8, so the marked span matches the one byte
the eval writes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netdevsim: zero initialize struct iphdr in dummy sk_buff
Syzbot reports a KMSAN uninit-value originating from
nsim_dev_trap_skb_build, with the allocation also
being performed in the same function.
Fix this by calling skb_put_zero instead of skb_put to
guarantee zero initialization of the whole IP header. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hamradio: 6pack: fix uninit-value in sixpack_receive_buf
sixpack_receive_buf() does not properly skip bytes with TTY error flags.
The while loop iterates through the flags buffer but never advances the
data pointer (cp), and passes the original count (including error bytes)
to sixpack_decode(). This causes sixpack_decode() to process bytes that
should have been skipped due to TTY errors. The TTY layer does not
guarantee that cp[i] holds a meaningful value when fp[i] is set, so
passing those positions to sixpack_decode() results in KMSAN reporting
an uninit-value read.
Fix this by processing bytes one at a time, advancing cp on each
iteration, and only passing valid (non-error) bytes to sixpack_decode().
This matches the pattern used by slip_receive_buf() and
mkiss_receive_buf() for the same purpose. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_exthdr: fix register tracking for F_PRESENT flag
nft_exthdr_init() passes user-controlled priv->len to
nft_parse_register_store(), which marks that many bytes in the
register bitmap as initialized. However, when NFT_EXTHDR_F_PRESENT
is set, the eval paths write only 1 byte (nft_reg_store8) or
4 bytes (*dest = 0 on TCP/DCCP error path). When len > 4,
registers beyond the first are never written, retaining
uninitialized stack data from nft_regs.
Bail out if userspace requests too much data when F_PRESENT is set. |
| An access to an uninitialized pointer flaw was found in X.Org and Xwayland. The function compCheckRedirect() may fail if it cannot allocate the backing pixmap. In that case, compRedirectWindow() will return a BadAlloc error without validating the window tree marked just before, which leaves the validated data partly initialized and the use of an uninitialized pointer later. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mctp: ensure our nlmsg responses are initialised
Syed Faraz Abrar (@farazsth98) from Zellic, and Pumpkin (@u1f383) from
DEVCORE Research Team working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
report that a RTM_GETNEIGH will return uninitalised data in the pad
bytes of the ndmsg data.
Ensure we're initialising the netlink data to zero, in the link, addr
and neigh response messages. |
| Uninitialized Use in GPU in Google Chrome on Android prior to 149.0.7827.155 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Dreamweaver Desktop versions 21.7 and earlier are affected by an Access of Uninitialized Pointer vulnerability that could result in arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user. Exploitation of this issue requires user interaction in that a victim must open a malicious file. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: usblp: fix uninitialized heap leak via LPGETSTATUS ioctl
Just like in a previous problem in this driver, usblp_ctrl_msg() will
collapse the usb_control_msg() return value to 0/-errno, discarding the
actual number of bytes transferred.
Ideally that short command should be detected and error out, but many
printers are known to send "incorrect" responses back so we can't just
do that.
statusbuf is kmalloc(8) at probe time and never filled before the first
LPGETSTATUS ioctl.
usblp_read_status() requests 1 byte. If a malicious printer responds
with zero bytes, *statusbuf is one byte of stale kmalloc heap,
sign-extended into the local int status, which the LPGETSTATUS path then
copy_to_user()s directly to the ioctl caller.
Fix this all by just zapping out the memory buffer when allocated at
probe time. If a later call does a short read, the data will be
identical to what the device sent it the last time, so there is no
"leak" of information happening. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/virtio: fix empty payload in tap skb for non-linear buffers
For non-linear skbs, virtio_transport_build_skb() goes through
virtio_transport_copy_nonlinear_skb() to copy the original payload
in the new skb to be delivered to the vsockmon tap device.
This manually initializes an iov_iter but does not set iov_iter.count.
Since the iov_iter is zero-initialized, the copy length is zero and no
payload is actually copied to the monitor interface, leaving data
un-initialized.
Fix this by removing the linear vs non-linear split and using
skb_copy_datagram_iter() with iov_iter_kvec() for all cases, as
vhost-vsock already does. This handles both linear and non-linear skbs,
properly initializes the iov_iter, and removes the now unused
virtio_transport_copy_nonlinear_skb().
While touching this code, let's also check the return value of
skb_copy_datagram_iter(), even though it's unlikely to fail. |
| Uninitialized Use in Codecs in Google Chrome on Linux, ChromeOS prior to 149.0.7827.103 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted video file. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: usblp: fix heap leak in IEEE 1284 device ID via short response
usblp_ctrl_msg() collapses the usb_control_msg() return value to
0/-errno, discarding the actual number of bytes transferred. A broken
printer can complete the GET_DEVICE_ID control transfer short and the
driver has no way to know.
usblp_cache_device_id_string() reads the 2-byte big-endian length prefix
from the response and trusts it (clamped only to the buffer bounds).
The buffer is kmalloc(1024) at probe time. A device that sends exactly
two bytes (e.g. 0x03 0xFF, claiming a 1023-byte ID) leaves
device_id_string[2..1022] holding stale kmalloc heap.
That stale data is then exposed:
- via the ieee1284_id sysfs attribute (sprintf("%s", buf+2), truncated
at the first NUL in the stale heap), and
- via the IOCNR_GET_DEVICE_ID ioctl, which copy_to_user()s the full
claimed length regardless of NULs, up to 1021 bytes of uninitialized
heap, with the leak size chosen by the device.
Fix this up by just zapping the buffer with zeros before each request
sent to the device. |
